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Introduction 
“Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is 
especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”1 
 
“Theories and arguments based upon racial, ethnic and most other 
stereotypes are antithetical to and impermissible in a fair and impartial 
trial.”2 
 
We are in a moment of reckoning about the influence of racial bias 
on the criminal justice system.3 To give only a few examples, increased 
scrutiny is being placed on racially-motivated police brutality and other 
 
1. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979). 
2. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011) (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Dhaliwal, 79 P.3d 432, 444 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers, J., 
concurring)). 
3. While this reckoning seems to be gaining traction and speed now, it is not 
entirely new; many voices have been calling for this reckoning for a long 
time. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 
Geo. L.J. 2227, 2235 (2001) (noting that “[r]acial contamination of the 
criminal law in the sway of bias and discrimination is well documented” 
and citing sources documenting that history). 
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misconduct,4 and on the racial dimensions of mass incarceration.5 The 
United States Supreme Court recently described racial bias as “a 
familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic 
injury to the administration of justice.”6 In the last few years, the Court 
has frankly acknowledged ways that individual actors’ racial biases can 
affect the criminal justice system, including through jury selection7 and 
race-based arguments during jury deliberation.8 And earlier this year, 
the Court acknowledged the “clear” racist origins of a structural issue, 
the use by two states of nonunanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases.9 
An overlooked piece of this reckoning, however, is the racist rhetoric10 
that prosecutors sometimes use in arguing cases. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the 
Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.” 11 
 
4. See, e.g., Isabel Bilotta, Abby Corrington, Saaid A. Mendoza, Ivy Watson 
& Eden King, How Subtle Bias Infects the Law, 15 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Sci. 227, 229 (2019) (discussing bias in policing generally and statistics 
showing disproportionate police killings of unarmed Black and Latino 
individuals). Beyond police brutality, there is increased scrutiny on the role 
of police in the disproportionate outcomes for people of color within the 
criminal justice system. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Warren, Hidden in Plain 
View: Juries and the Implicit Credibility Given to Police Testimony, 11 
DePaul J. Soc. Just. 1 (2018) (arguing that jurors often make unfounded 
assumptions regarding police credibility). 
5. See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2020) (discussing racial 
imbalances and the mass incarcerations of Black men). 
6. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017). 
7. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019) (holding that the trial 
court clearly erred in concluding that the state’s peremptory challenge of a 
Black juror “was not ‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent’” 
(quoting Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016))). Although the 
court articulated its holding very narrowly, the court explicitly relied on four 
“critical facts” that each showed racial bias in the prosecutor’s actions. See 
id. 
8. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (holding that an exception to the 
non-impeachment rule about jury verdicts is needed to allow trial courts 
to consider juror reports about racially biased comments or actions). 
9. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020) (noting the “clear” racist 
origins of laws in Oregon and Louisiana allowing for criminal convictions 
without jury unanimity). However, the Supreme Court has only rarely used 
the terms “racist” or “racism,” and there is reason to be cautious about the 
extent to which the Court is ready to fully engage in this reckoning. See 
generally Kathryn Stanchi, The Rhetoric of Racism in the United States 
Supreme Court (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
10. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text for the explanation of why 
this article uses the term “racist prosecutorial rhetoric.” 
11. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987). 
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However, that statement was made in a footnote of a case that did not 
specifically address prosecutorial misconduct.12 The Court has never 
squarely focused on racially biased prosecutorial arguments, so it has 
not clarified how courts should analyze this issue. 13  While Justice 
Sotomayor in 2013 rebuked a prosecutor for “tapp[ing] a deep and sorry 
vein of racial prejudice that has run through the history of criminal 
justice in our Nation,” she did so in an order denying certiorari.14 The 
Court’s failure to take a case that squarely presents this issue has left 
lower federal courts, state courts, and commentators struggling to 
provide a useful framework for analyzing these issues, or even to 
identify what part of the Constitution they violate.15 
My earlier article on prosecutorial misconduct, Mitigating Foul 
Blows, offered a framework to try to combat the “helpless piety” 
displayed by courts when they are quick both to condemn prosecutorial 
arguments as improper and to affirm resulting convictions based on 
procedural doctrines such as harmless error.16 However, that article did 
 
12. Id. at 283–85 (McCleskey was about statistical evidence of racial bias in 
death penalty cases; the court noted the prosecutor’s racially biased language 
in passing but did not directly analyze that issue). 
13. McCleskey cited Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), for the 
proposition that the Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial 
arguments. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 n.30. But the dissent in a later case 
noted that there were only two allegedly improper comments in the closing 
in Donnelly, and one of those was ambiguous. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168, 193 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Darden involved more racist 
comments, but those comments were interwoven with other improper appeals. 
See id. at 189–92 n.2. Neither Darden nor Donnelly directly confronted the 
racial components of the comments, and both held that the trials were not so 
infected with unfairness as to justify reversal of the convictions. Darden, 477 
U.S. at 181–82; Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645. 
14. Calhoun v. United States, 568 U.S. 1206, 1206–08 (2017) (statement of 
Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) 
(justifying the denial of certiorari given “the unusual way in which this 
case has been litigated” and the defendant’s failure to raise the relevant 
arguments before the circuit court, but clarifying that “I write to dispel 
any doubt whether the Court’s denial of certiorari should be understood 
to signal our tolerance of a federal prosecutor’s racially charged remark. 
It should not.”). 
15. For example, Justice Sotomayor’s statement in the order denying 
certiorari mentions three theories (equal protection, right to an impartial 
jury under the Sixth Amendment, and the ABA Standards on Prosecution 
and Defense Function), but only gives a single sentence about each one. 
Id. at 1207–08. Commentators generally focus on equal protection, right 
to an impartial jury, and the due process clause’s guarantee of a fair trial. 
See, e.g., Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A Proposal for 
Handling Prosecutorial Appeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice 
During Trial, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 319, 320 (2001). 
16. Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 Ga. L. Rev. 309, 352 
(2015) (quoting United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 
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not address whether racist prosecutorial rhetoric should be treated 
differently than other types of prosecutorial misconduct. This article 
concludes that it should.17 
More specifically, this article relies on social science research to 
argue that courts should reevaluate their analysis of prosecutorial 
appeals to race, and this article focuses on trial courts for solutions. 
Specifically, Part I provides foundational information needed to 
understand racist prosecutorial rhetoric and summarizes social science 
research on how race affects decision-making.18 Part II explains the 
inadequate state of current law. It describes modern case law demon–
strating that prosecutors are using racist rhetoric, 19  explores the 
disconnect between the social science research and courts’ treatment of 
that rhetoric, and describes the courts’ procedural barriers to relief that 
actually incentivize rather than discourage racist prosecutorial 
rhetoric.20 
 
661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting)); see generally id. at 362–73 
(arguing for changes to appellate court review of prosecutorial misconduct 
claims, such as using an error-focused rather than a guilt-focused approach 
to harmless error analysis, looking at what effect the improper argument 
was likely to have had on the trial rather than on the strength of the other 
evidence against the defendant). 
17. Although the Court’s decision about racial bias in jury deliberations is not 
directly applicable, the reasoning is relevant: “This Court’s decisions 
demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional, and 
institutional concerns.” Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 
(2017). The Court also stated that “there is a sound basis to treat racial 
bias with added precautions. A constitutional rule that racial bias in the 
justice system must be addressed . . . is necessary to prevent a systemic 
loss of confidence in jury verdicts . . . .” Id. at 869. 
18. See generally Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision 
Making, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 269, 271 (2015) (summarizing dozens 
of studies showing how race affects jury decision-making); Lucy Jewel, 
Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing 
Alternatives, 76 Md. L. Rev. 663 (2017) (explaining how racist rhetoric 
physically changes our brains through creation of toxic neural pathways, and 
arguing that counternarratives can help create healing pathways, both 
individually and collectively). 
19. Perhaps the most appalling example of racist prosecutorial rhetoric 
involves analogizing Black defendants to animals, a practice that has been 
repeatedly and recently upheld by the California state courts. See 
generally Shana Heller, Dehumanization and Implicit Bias: Why Courts 
Should Preclude References to Animal Imagery in Criminal Trials, 51 
Crim. L. Bull. 870 (2015) (exploring the effects of prosecutors referring 
to Black defendants with animal imagery). 
20. Bowman, supra note 16, at 315–16 (explaining that when prosecutors have 
a strong case, then any misconduct is likely to be harmless; when prosecutors 
have a weak case, the risk of acquittal is higher than the risk of an appellate 
court ordering a new trial). 
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Part III argues that trial courts, not appellate courts, should be the 
focus for solutions to racist prosecutorial rhetoric. It also explains why 
trial courts should focus specifically on prosecutors and provides an 
overview of debiasing strategies. Part IV builds on this foundation by 
offering specific solutions that trial courts should implement. That 
section recommends using voir dire and early jury instructions to prime 
jurors for egalitarianism rather than susceptibility to prejudice. Most 
significantly, it argues that trial courts should aim to prevent racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric through use of a checklist that would clarify what 
rhetoric is absolutely prohibited and what rhetoric requires a case-by-
case determination of appropriateness. Prosecutors would then need to 
bring a motion in limine to facilitate those case-specific determinations. 
Part IV also contains strategies for trial courts responding to problems 
during trial and a method for tracking violators across multiple trials. 
The combination of these solutions would help prevent racist pros–
ecutorial rhetoric and minimize harm when it occurs. 
I. How and Why is Racist Prosecutorial         
Rhetoric So Problematic? 
Racial bias “in the jury process can change the course of individual 
lives, diminish confidence in the justice system, and have profound 
effects on society.”21 This section presents foundational information 
needed to understand how racial bias can infect the jury process 
through racist prosecutorial rhetoric. This section first provides an 
overview of foundational concepts necessary for understanding racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric. It then describes various ways in which racist 
rhetoric affects decision-making. 
A. Overview of Foundational Concepts for Understanding            
Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric 
There can be no doubt at this point that racially-charged language 
affects decision-making in a variety of contexts, including criminal 
trials, although scholars debate how to conceptualize the way these 
effects occur.22 Much of the legal scholarship over the last twenty or  
21. Hunt, supra note 18, at 283. 
22. Compare L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the 
Criminal Courtroom, 126 Yale L.J. 862, 865 (2017) (“[R]esearch from the 
past several decades reveals that implicit racial biases can influence the 
behaviors and judgments of even the most consciously egalitarian individuals 
in ways of which they are unaware and thus unable to control.”), with 
Jonathan Kahn, Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets 
Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Justice 67–68 (2018) (“[T]he 
normalizing of implicit bias as common and pervasive . . . carries with it 
the implication that explicit bias is abnormal, uncommon, and even 
scientifically uninteresting” and that suggesting that explicit racism is a 
thing of the past “allows us to ignore subtler or more nuanced forms of 
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more years has focused on “implicit bias,” sometimes called 
“unconscious racism.”23 Implicit biases “are composed of well-learned 
associations that reside below conscious awareness and can auto–
matically drive behavior in a manner that is inconsistent with one’s 
personal attitudes[,]” while “[e]xplicit biases are the beliefs that people 
consciously possess and intentionally express . . . .”24 Other scholars, 
however, argue that the current focus on implicit bias minimizes the 
importance of overt or explicit bias and suggest that focusing too 
heavily on implicit bias is part of the problematic but widespread view 
that America is now “postracial.”25 Still other scholars reject a “rigid 
dichotomy” between explicit and implicit biases, noting instead that 
“implicit bias measures might be revealing concealed [but conscious] 
beliefs rather than unconscious ones.”26 
 
racism—or frankly any form of racist practice that does not look the same 
as what came before.”). 
23. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit 
Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1555 (2013); see 
also Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 
297, 311 (1990) (“This paradox of irrationality and normalcy is part of the 
reason for the unconscious nature of the racism. When our culture teaches 
us to be racist and our ideology teaches us that racism is evil, we respond 
by excluding the forbidden lesson from our consciousness.”). 
24. Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 228–29; see also Jerry Kang, Judge Mark 
Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, 
Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, 
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1132 (2012) 
(distinguishing explicit bias from implicit bias based on whether the attitudes 
and beliefs involved are “consciously accessible through introspection”). 
25. See Kahn, supra note 22, at 66; see also id. at 67 (noting that this 
minimization of explicit bias occurs in a variety of fields, including in 
neuroscientific studies of implicit bias). Kahn also notes that this view of 
overt expressions of prejudice being extreme and abnormal “hearkens oddly 
back to the first wave of psychological research on prejudice from the 1920s 
to the 1950s, which presented explicit prejudice as a pathological aberration 
from normal thinking.” Id.; see also Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & 
Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial 
Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 513, 564 (2014) (“One mild surprise in our results, however, was that 
explicit bias matters too. Even though the days of rampant and overt racism 
are mostly gone, our study shows that it is still valuable to monitor explicit 
racial bias, at least in capital cases.”). 
26. Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 
50 Ariz. St. L.J. 193, 198, 211 (2018); see also id. at 214–15 (“[W]hen [an] 
individual denies a racial motive we cannot know if she is being honest or 
whether she is simply and consciously concealing her own discrimination. It 
also might be the case that although the person was truly unaware of the 
operational bias, with a little effort she may have been able to access that 
bias, in other words, it need not be an all or nothing proposition.”); Jessica 
A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 505, 521–22 (2018) (discussing 
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This article does not seek to resolve these broader debates. Instead, 
it takes the position that each of these approaches, as well as others 
discussed below, provide meaningful lenses through which to under–
stand how and why racist prosecutorial rhetoric affects criminal trials. 
Despite the common tendency to rely on sweeping characterizations, 
“attitudes and beliefs about race have long been internally complex and 
have only become more so . . . .”27 This article therefore discusses 
both the cognitive states of individual actors and the larger structural 
racism issues.28 
This article also focuses on strategies for controlling and minimizing 
the effects of bias, regardless of whether that bias is implicit or explicit. 
Some scholars critique implicit bias scholarship as wrongly suggesting 
that implicit bias is uncontrollable, when in fact social psychology 
research provides several effective strategies for controlling implicit 
bias.29 Furthermore, research indicates that treating bias as unconscious 
makes it easier for people to avoid taking responsibility for controlling 
their biases.30 Thus, this article uses the term “implicit bias” rather 
than “unconscious bias” to help create the foundation for concrete 
actions to mitigate these biases, and it draws on the extensive social 
science research that provides tools for doing so. 
Furthermore, in exploring these issues, the focus must be on racist 
rhetoric, not racist prosecutors—i.e., on the language used rather than 
on the moral culpability of the person using those words. Beyond 
sidestepping the broader debate about explicit bias versus concealed-
but-conscious bias versus implicit bias, this approach reflects the idea 
 
evidence that people are aware of but underreport their explicit biases); 
Gregory Mitchell, An Implicit Bias Primer, 25 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 27, 
42–45 (2018) (noting that “presently the empirical data do not allow 
researchers to declare whether implicit bias and explicit bias are truly 
distinct” and then describing the ambiguities in the empirical research). 
27. Kahn, supra note 22, at 70 (quoting Lawrence D. Bobo & Camille Z. Charles, 
Race in the American Mind: From the Moynihan Report to the Obama 
Candidacy, 621 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 243, 244 (2009)). 
28. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from 
Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1241, 1280 (2002) 
(“[D]iscrimination is a product not only of stereotyping and psychological 
prejudice, but also of institutional structures and practices through which 
individual attitudes and behavior play out.”). A July 2020 survey of judges 
through the National Judicial College reveals that most judges (65% of 
those who responded) “believe that systemic racism exists in the criminal 
justice system.” Anna-Leigh Firth, Most Judges Believe the Criminal 
Justice System Suffers from Racism, The National Judicial College 
(July 14, 2020), https://www.judges.org/ (search title in search bar; then 
follow hyperlink of title) [https://perma.cc/SVW9-WM6U]. 
29. Selmi, supra note 26, at 197–98. 
30. Id. at 218. 
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that people more easily recognize speech as racist, even when they 
would not use that label for the speaker.31 Additionally, focusing on the 
speaker rather than the words used would echo the problems with the 
application of Batson v. Kentucky32 regarding jury selection; scholars 
have rightly argued that Batson has been ineffective in part because 
the court has to essentially conclude that the prosecutor was being 
racist, rather than focus on the prosecutor’s actions.33 Here, focusing on 
the person would necessarily require a focus on the prosecutor’s intent, 
which generally only allows courts to address overt rather than subtle 
references to race.34 Moreover, remedying structural racism requires a 
focus on the harm caused rather than on whether someone intended 
that harm.35 And as explained in more detail below, significant harm 
can come from the prosecutor’s rhetoric, regardless of the prosecutor’s 
intent.36  
31. See Kahn, supra note 22, at 70 (describing several examples where people 
were willing to call remarks but not speakers racist and noting that “even 
bigots can be conflicted about their racist attitudes”). 
32. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
33. See, e.g., Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations, 
118 Colum. L. Rev. 713, 720–21 (2018) (“According to this critique, the 
awkwardness of branding the prosecutor racist raises the stakes for all 
involved and is another impediment to finding a Batson violation.”); Nancy 
S. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson and the 
Peremptory Challenge, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 1137, 1184 (2017) (noting that 
the court “would essentially be calling them liars or racists”). Another related 
problem with Batson is that prosecutors may not realize the effect that 
stereotypes may have shaped their perception of the reasons for the strike: 
“When asked to provide a race-neutral reason for the strike, the attorney 
may sincerely believe that she struck the prospective juror for reasons not 
related to the juror’s race, even though implicit racial bias may have in fact 
influenced the attorney’s perceptions of the individual.” Cynthia Lee, A New 
Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 843, 851 
(2015). 
34. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Earle, Note: Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An 
Approach to the Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1212, 1227–29 (1992). 
35. See, e.g., Gilbert C. Gee & Chandra L. Ford, Structural Racism and 
Health Inequities: Old Issues, New Directions, 8 Du Bois Rev. 115 (2011) 
(defining structural racism as “as the macrolevel systems, social forces, 
institutions, ideologies, and processes that interact with one another to 
generate and reinforce inequities among racial and ethnic groups.”). 
36. See, e.g., Jewel, supra note 18, at 664 (“The harmful rhetoric used to describe 
racial minorities and other subordinated groups produces toxic thought 
patterns that can become entrenched in the public mind.”); Bilotta et al., 
supra note 4, at 229 (“It is important to note that the subtle discrimination 
that emerges as a result of implicit biases is just as harmful as overt discrim–
ination, if not more so, because the target is more likely to internalize the 
experience than to discount it as discrimination.”); State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 
1213, 1216 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014) (“[A] prosecutor’s mental state, however 
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Rhetoric can be defined narrowly as the art of persuasion or a 
process for discovering the truth by argumentation, but also can more 
broadly include “language, conversation, words, and even images” 
involved in persuasive communication. 37  “Modern rhetoric is also 
interdisciplinary, engaging with social and scientific theories to under–
stand how people are persuaded.”38 Theories of rhetoric explain the 
effectiveness of appeals to stereotypes,39 and courts have often allowed 
prosecutors to use these appeals without consequence.40 This article 
uses the terms “racist rhetoric” or “racist prosecutorial rhetoric” to 
mean these appeals to racial stereotypes, whether deployed consciously 
or unconsciously.41 This rhetoric is racist, regardless of the individual 
prosecutor’s intent in using it, because of the likelihood of triggering 
racial stereotypes in those who hear it.42 
 
innocent, does not determine the message received by the jurors or their 
individual responses to it.”). 
37. Jewel, supra note 18, at 665. 
38. Id. at 666. 
39. Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming 
the Promise of Searching Analysis, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 325, 327 (2006). 
40. See generally id. (discussing methods counsel can use in an appeal when 
the trial was tarnished by the use of racial stereotypes). 
41. See Earle, supra note 34, at 1214 n.11 (using the term “prosecutorial racism” 
“as a shorthand for arguments, unconscious or intentional, that pose the dan–
ger of evoking impermissible and irrelevant racial considerations in the minds 
of jurors.”). Earle’s use of “prosecutorial racism” is similar to my preferred 
“racist prosecutorial rhetoric” in that it does not focus on intent, although I 
think it is also important to include the idea of rhetoric in framing the problem. 
Cf. Alford, supra note 39, at 326–27 (discussing “racist summations” as 
including “indirect . . . [rather than explicitly biased] yet highly inflammatory” 
language while arguing that the “indirect” racism displayed can be argued to 
be intentional given its similarities to classical rhetoric techniques). I agree 
with Alford about the similarity of modern racist prosecutorial rhetoric to 
classical rhetorical techniques, but I recommend avoiding focusing on whether 
the use of that rhetoric is intentional. See also Stanchi, supra note 9, at Part 
II (discussing the rhetorical power of the words “racist” and “racism” that are 
lacking in “softer” alternatives). 
42. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An 
Introduction 183 (3rd ed. 2017) (defining racism—without an intent 
requirement—as “any program or practice of discrimination, segregation, 
persecution, or mistreatment based on membership in a race or ethnic 
group”); see also Anna Spain Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 Harv. 
Hum. Rts. J. 1, 28 (2019) (“The common feature that connects racism 
across countries and spaces is its role in advancing a social hierarchy that 
places some people at the bottom and others at the top based on constructed 
racial categories. This hierarchy of racial ideology perpetuates a power 
structure that becomes embedded in law, politics, economic activity, and 
culture.”); see also infra Section I(B) regarding the effect of race on juror 
decision-making, including how racist rhetoric exacerbates underlying biases. 
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Racist rhetoric is problematic when used by anyone in a criminal 
trial, but it is particularly problematic given prosecutors’ special role in 
the criminal justice system. Prosecutors are supposed to serve as 
representatives of the people, not as the representative of crime victims, 
and “the prosecutor’s primary responsibility is to the administration of 
justice, not just winning cases.” 43  This special role undergirds the 
Supreme Court’s famous exhortation that while prosecutors “may strike 
hard blows, [they are] not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much 
[their] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about 
a just one.”44 Courts need to make this exhortation meaningful given 
modern research showing that jurors’ explicit and implicit biases tend 
to favor the prosecution in criminal trials.45 One step toward ridding 
the criminal justice system of racial bias involves understanding how 
racist prosecutorial rhetoric activates juror biases. 
Racist prosecutorial rhetoric also harms communities of color. 
Professor Anthony Alfieri notes that when racialized narratives are 
brought into criminal trials, “they apply a juridical gloss to such images 
and tropes, restyling popular meaning by force of law. . . . Not only 
do they translate social meaning into law, but they also construct social 
meaning out of law.” 46  Furthermore, he discusses the harms to 
communities of color that can occur from problematic racial narratives, 
such as the denigration of individuals’ experiences and communities, as 
well as a loss of faith in the system.47 Alfieri therefore urges a “new 
ethic of prosecution” that is “respectful of the dignity of racial identity 
and the integrity of racial community.”48 This article joins that call. 
 
43. Lyon, supra note 15, at 335. 
44. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). “This exhortation . . . is 
frequently cited by courts reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, 
defense counsel raising those claims, and academics commenting on 
prosecutorial behavior.” Bowman, supra note 16, at 312. 
45. Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1503, 1529 (2015) (noting that explicit biases include 
widespread beliefs that “prosecutors are unimpeachable . . . and that the 
presumption of innocence is a fiction”; implicit biases “tend to disfavor people 
of color, and thus a disproportionate number of criminal defendants” in ways 
that “can affect all of the main tasks that jurors are called on to perform”). 
46. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 2229. 
47. Id. at 2240. While Alfieri was specifically talking about the Central Park 
Jogger case, his critique is appliable more broadly. Alfieri also notes that both 
the law and narrative tradition and critical race theory demonstrate the need 
for rethinking the use of stereotypes, among other longstanding traditions in 
prosecutorial practices. See id. at 2229–30. 
48. Id. at 2241–42. 
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B. How Race Affects Juror Decision-Making 
“[M]ost participants in the criminal justice system believe that they 
can make fair and unbiased decisions, but data continue to show results 
markedly differentiated by race.” 49  The last several decades have 
produced extensive social science research on how race affects jury 
decision-making. 50  This section does not purport to exhaustively 
summarize that research; instead, it explores findings and themes from 
this research that provide a helpful context51 for understanding how 
decision-making can be affected by racist prosecutorial rhetoric.52 
1. Ingroup versus Outgroup Bias 
One important way that race affects decision-making is through 
ingroup versus outgroup bias. Ingroup bias “occurs when people make 
more positive judgments about individuals who belong to the same  
49. Praatika Prasad, Implicit Racial Biases in Prosecutorial Summations: 
Proposing an Integrated Response, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 3091, 3095–96 
(2018) (citing Achieving an Impartial Jury (AIJ) Toolbox, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljusti
ce/voirdire_toolchest.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGJ7-BPBV]). 
While not directly relevant to the topic of this article, there is particularly 
disturbing research on “shooter bias” and “weapon perception,” which shows 
through a variety of experiments that people are both quicker to shoot and 
more likely to mis-identify a non-weapon as a weapon for Black rather than 
white individuals, regardless of whether they display explicit biases. See, e.g., 
Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 230–31 (summarizing multiple studies). But 
see Selmi, supra note 26, at 204–05 (discussing conflicting studies on “shooter 
bias” and stating that “even if one accepts that there is a shooter bias, there 
is no clear reason to conclude that the bias is implicit rather than explicit.”). 
50. This research includes both experimental studies (using mock juries and 
some divergence from trial practices in order to more precisely test the role 
of race in decision-making) and review of decisions in actual cases. See Hunt, 
supra note 18, at 271 (concluding that together, these methods “provide 
converging evidence that race and ethnicity influence jury decisions and 
trial outcomes”); Selmi, supra note 26, at 233 (discussing the value of both 
laboratory studies that attempt to isolate facets of discrimination beyond 
what is possible in real world activities, and field studies that allow 
researchers to “test their theories in actual settings” and therefore “provide 
more compelling evidence of the pervasiveness of discrimination”). 
51. In other words, most of the social science research discussed below involves 
studies that do not involve prosecutorial rhetoric in criminal cases. But the 
results of these studies still provide the backdrop against which prosecutors’ 
racist rhetoric becomes particularly likely to impact jury decision-making. 
52. See Hunt, supra note 18, at 277 (discussing that while these different 
mechanisms can have an explicit component most social scientists believe 
that “these processes tend to be subtle, if not wholly implicit, making them 
difficult for jurors to recognize and control.”). That means that jurors may 
genuinely believe that they are basing their judgments on the evidence and 
complying with jury instructions, while in fact their decisions are being 
influenced by racial biases in ways they fail to recognize or remedy. 
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social category simply because of shared group membership.”53 Out–
group bias, on the other hand, involves negative judgments against 
individuals who are not part of the same group.54 
This dynamic is exemplified in the social science research showing 
that “jurors tend to make more lenient judgments of same-race 
defendants and harsher judgments of other-race defendants.”55 One 
study related to this theory showed that white jurors rated the 
culpability of Black defendants more strongly than white defendants 
when the evidence was ambiguous; given the frequency of plea bargains 
in criminal cases, that study likely mirrors many real-life trials.56 It also 
helps explain the fact that the tendency for jurors to more harshly judge 
defendants of a different race or ethnicity is particularly pronounced in 
non-capital cases;57 while non-capital cases with strong evidence are 
often pled, capital cases with similar strength of evidence may go to 
trial because of the penalty consequences.58 That may explain why in 
capital cases, the race of the victim is more important than the race of 
the defendant in predicting when the defendant will receive the death 
penalty.59 This finding may also relate to research on Aversive Racism 
Theory, which shows that people try to avoid bias when they are aware  
53. Id. at 275 (citation omitted).  
54. See id. at 276; cf. Maureen Johnson, Separate But (Un)equal: Why 
Institutionalized Anti-Racism is the Answer to the Never-Ending Cycle of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. 327, 378 (2018) (quoting Terry 
Smith, White Backlash in a Brown Country, 50 Val. U. L. Rev. 89, 98 
(2015)) (discussing scholars, including psychologists, who hypothesize that 
racism goes beyond simple outgroup bias and also includes a component of 
“addiction” to the privileges of power for those in the dominant cultural 
group). 
55. Hunt, supra note 18, at 274 (citation omitted); see also id. at 271 (discussing 
dozens of experimental studies and two meta-analyses synthesizing the 
research confirming this pattern, which “often is referred to as the similarity-
leniency effect”). 
56. Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors Racial Biases: The Effects of 
Content and Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 Yale L.J. 1690, 1708 
(2015) (noting that when the evidence is strong, prosecutors often seek a 
plea bargain, and when the evidence is weak, defense counsel often seek a 
plea bargain). 
57. Hunt, supra note 18, at 273. 
58. See Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
475, 481 (2013) (discussing how plea bargaining is “theoretically ambiguous” 
in terms of its effect on the death penalty and how prosecutors may not offer 
desirable plea deals to defendants who have been charged with capital 
punishment). 
59. Hunt, supra note 18, at 273. Additionally, “racial bias in death sentencing 
is stronger among White male jurors . . . . Black defendants are 41% more 
likely to receive the death penalty when juries include five or more White 
men.” Id. 
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of its potential effect.60 Research shows that jurors do a better job of 
guarding against the influence of prejudice when race is treated as 
salient than when they do not see race as salient.61 Thus, when race is 
not treated as salient, then white jurors’ implicit biases often play a 
role, but biased decision-making is reduced when race is made salient.62 
In non-capital cases, white jurors may be less likely to see race as 
significant, so they may be less likely to control their outgroup biases 
against defendants of color.63 
Another example of the ingroup versus outgroup bias dynamic 
involves “attributions, that is, explanations about the causes of behav–
ior.”64 Research shows that white jurors are more likely to attribute 
petty crime by white juveniles to “succumbing to peer pressure in the 
moment,” while the same jurors are more likely to attribute the same 
act by a Black juvenile as being “destructive and defiant.”65 In the 
death penalty context, “White jurors, especially men,” were more likely 
to view defendants as “vicious and dangerous individuals who made 
their victims suffer” while Black male jurors were more likely to view 
defendants with empathy and “to believe that the defendant is 
remorseful.”66 These attribution distinctions are particularly pronoun–
 
60. Id. at 275; see also Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1695–96 (noting that 
aversive racism theory explains behavior of those who are “high in implicit 
racism, yet low in explicit racism—in other words, they are biased but are 
unaware of their biases.”). 
61. Hunt, supra note 18, at 275 (summarizing various studies); see also Samuel 
R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions 
of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
Bull. 1367, 1371 (2000) (noting that “for a run-of-the-mill case in which 
the defendant happens to be Black” race isn’t perceived by jurors as salient 
in the same way that they do when racial issues are more obviously central 
to a case). 
62. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1696; see also id. at 1698–99 (arguing that 
traditional definitions of race salience, which require race to be “central” 
to the trial, are too narrow and that instead subtle references to race can 
also debias juror responses). 
63. See Mikah K. Thompson, Bias on Trial: Toward an Open Discussion of 
Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 2018 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1243, 1281 
(2018) (explaining that in capital offenses the Supreme Court has stated 
that a “defendant has [a] right to request that prospective jurors be 
informed of the race of the victim and questioned regarding their potential 
race biases”); see also id. at 1282–83 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
later stated that this rule did not apply in a case where “the crime was 
victimless and nonviolent”). 
64. Hunt, supra note 18, at 275. 
65. Id. at 276 (citation omitted). 
66. Id. at 280 (citation omitted). 
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ced “when a criminal act is stereotypically associated with a defendant’s 
racial or ethnic group.”67 
2. The Power of Stereotypes 
Stereotypes play a powerful role in influencing decision-making. 
Stereotypes are the well-connected “associations among groups and 
traits established in children’s memories at an early age, before they 
have the cognitive skills to decide rationally upon the personal 
acceptability of the stereotypes.”68 These associations come at least in 
part from cultural forces and images, and they can be reinforced and 
strengthened in a variety of ways.69 The associations affect actions 
through stereotyping “when judgments are influenced by beliefs about 
the characteristics of people in a particular category (e.g., racial 
group).”70 
Stereotypes can involve ostensibly positive beliefs, such as the 
“Asian as model minority”71 association or the stereotype of Black 
women as “everyone’s favorite aunt or grandmother, . . . ready to 
 
67. Id. at 276 (citation omitted). 
68. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1248 (quoting Jody Armour, Stereotypes and 
Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 Cal. 
L. Rev. 733, 741 (1995)); see also Armour, supra, at 742 (using the same 
definition of stereotypes and distinguishing them from prejudice, which 
means “derogatory personal beliefs”). Armour notes that “some people’s 
stereotypes and personal beliefs overlap; that is, some people not only have 
knowledge of the cultural stereotypes from years of socialization, but they 
endorse and accept them as well.” Id. 
69. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 63, at 1252 (noting that “racial and ethnic 
stereotypes are part and parcel of American culture”); Pamela Wilkins, 
Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize 
Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. Va. L. Rev. 305, 324–25 
(2012) (discussing studies showing that media focus, particularly in local 
news broadcasts, give more airtime to crime committed by Black people 
and portraying them as more threatening than white criminals, which 
contributes to political rhetoric, combining to strengthen the association of 
Black people with crime); Richardson, supra note 22, at 881 (noting that 
“[f]illing criminal courtrooms with overwhelming numbers of people of color 
will likely strengthen the already ubiquitous conscious and unconscious 
association linking people of color with crime” and that even if lawyers and 
judges “understand on an intellectual level that this disproportionate 
representation is the predictable result of focusing law enforcement efforts 
on communities of color”). 
70. Hunt, supra note 18, at 275. Hunt distinguishes stereotypes from the 
related but distinct concept of prejudice. “In contrast, prejudice involves 
negative attitudes or evaluations (e.g., feelings of dislike) toward a social 
category.” Id. Stereotypes can be either positive or negative associations, 
but prejudices always involve negative characterizations. See id. at 280. 
71. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1252. 
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soothe everyone’s hurt . . . .” 72  However, even so-called positive 
stereotypes can have significant negative impacts on decision-making.73 
More commonly, however, stereotypes are negative, such as the 
association of Latinos with illegal immigration or Black people with 
crime.74 Other research shows stereotypes of Black people as dishonest, 
violent, and less intelligent than whites.75 These negative stereotypes 
are used to rationalize prejudice and justify harsh treatment of others.76 
For example, during slavery, the association of enslaved peoples with 
animals was used to justify barnlike housing conditions.77 
Courts have for decades treated as unlawful intentional discrim–
ination invoking stereotypes to justify decision-making. 78  Professor 
Michael Selmi describes an interview study gauging employers’ 
attitudes about race in which many interviewees referred to a perceived 
lack of work ethic and a “‘perceived threatening or criminal demeanor’ 
of Black men.”79  Selmi noted that these statements attempting to 
justify behavior based on stereotype would easily establish legal liability 
for discrimination. 80  Similarly, the United States Supreme Court 
recently treated as “overt racial bias” a juror’s argument for the defen–
 
72. Id. at 1251 (quoting Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra 
and the “Sistahs”: The Peculiar Treatment of African American Women 
in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. Gender, Race & Just. 625, 635–
36 (2000)).  
73. Id. at 1252. 
74. Id. at 1248. 
75. Id. at 1261–62. 
76. Johnson, supra note 54, at 374 (emphasis omitted). 
77. Id. at 375. 
78. See Selmi, supra note 26, at 199 (noting that when a police officer associates 
young Black men with criminal activity or when a school principal treats 
disciplinary issues differently depending on the race of the child involved, 
“[t]hese behaviors may be influenced by unconscious attitudes, but the 
behavior itself is deliberate and intentional and fits easily within standard 
legal doctrines”); id. at 241–45 (discussing a variety of legal contexts in 
which courts have explicitly relied on stereotyping to find unlawful 
discrimination, regardless of whether those stereotypes involved conscious 
versus unconscious biases). 
79. Id. at 240–41 (discussing and quoting Devah Pager & Diana Karafin, 
Bayesian Bigot? Statistical Discrimination, Stereotypes, and Employer 
Decision Making, 621 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 70, 77, 82 
(2009)). 
80. Id. at 241 (also noting that respondents acknowledged that they knew 
individuals who did not fit the stereotype, and that the “principal harm of 
stereotyping [is that] the group judgments are exaggerated and overbroad.”). 
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dant’s guilt in a sexual assault case by explicitly referencing multiple 
stereotypes of Mexican men mistreating women.81 
Stereotypes can also affect decision-making in a variety of more 
subtle ways, including soothing the cognitive dissonance that would 
otherwise result from significant structural inequities.82 The psycho–
logical theory of cognitive dissonance says that humans feel great 
discomfort when trying to maintain two conflicting beliefs, so to 
alleviate that discomfort, we unknowingly move ourselves into a state 
of denial about the less-significant of the two beliefs.83 Frequently, 
rather than simply denying information that conflicts with our domin–
ant belief, we make ourselves feel better by “strongly lash[ing] out 
against the competing belief, convincing ourselves that it is dead wrong 
and must be soundly defeated.” 84  Cognitive dissonance thus helps 
explain why police and prosecutors often come up with “outlandish 
theories” of guilt in response to DNA evidence exonerating someone 
convicted of a crime; these police and prosecutors have an internalized 
view of being fighters for justice that makes it very difficult to accept 
that they could have contributed to a wrongful conviction.85 Stereo–
types facilitate that process, helping individuals rationalize prejudices 
and avoid guilt.86 And modern research has shown that stereotypes are 
particularly likely to affect decision-making when an individual is “not 
motivated to seek individuating information about members of stereo–
typed groups” and when an individual is “under stress or . . . pressed 
for time.”87 In those circumstances, both of which are common in the 
 
81. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“[W]here a juror 
makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes 
or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires 
that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to 
consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of 
the jury trial guarantee.”). 
82. Johnson, supra note 54, at 374. 
83. Mark Godsey, Blind Injustice: A Former Prosecutor Exposes the 
Psychology and Politics of Wrongful Convictions 18 (2017). 
84. Id.; see also id. at 18–19 (discussing how this theory helps explain how 
many ordinary Germans, particularly those closer in the hierarchy to the 
concentration camps, fully adopted the Nazi position “in order to internally 
justify their actions and avoid dissonance”). 
85. Id. at 20. 
86. Johnson, supra note 54, at 374 (emphasis omitted). This process may also 
help explain the way that people who believe in equality nevertheless 
rationalize the racial disproportionalities within the criminal justice system. 
87. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1249. This description of conditions that lead 
to an increased role for implicit biases echoes the “situation of pressurized 
decision making by all courtroom actors as systematic triage.” Richardson, 
supra note 22, at 878 (footnote omitted) (“[E]xcessive caseloads impact 
defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges alike, creating pressure on each of 
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criminal justice system, people rely less on logic and more on mental 
shortcuts.88 
Additionally, research shows crucial connections between the 
nature of the crime and racial stereotypes. Studies show that when news 
stories on violent crime omit the race of the perpetrator, the majority 
of white audience members assumes that the perpetrator was Black.89 
“Jurors are more likely to render guilty verdicts and recommend harsh 
sentences when defendants are accused of committing crimes that are 
stereotypically associated with their racial or ethnic group.” 90  For 
example, judgment and sentencing decisions tend to be harsher when 
white defendants are accused of financial crimes such as embezzlement 
or fraud, while Black defendants face harsher outcomes than white 
defendants for theft and violent crimes. 91  This affect seems to be 
“especially strong for serious and violent crimes.”92 Additional research 
suggests that stereotypes affect information processing and memory. 
“[I]ndividuals who are impacted by stereotypes do a better job of 
processing stereotype-consistent information as compared to stereotype-
inconsistent information.”93 Regarding memory, “stereotypes facilitate 
the way the brain stores and processes information”; when people 
attempt to recall “hazy” memories, they often fill in those memories 
with stereotypes. 94  Consequently, “people often recall stereotype-
consistent information more easily than stereotype-inconsistent infor–
mation.”95 
Stereotypes likely interact with ingroup versus outgroup biases as 
well. For example, some research shows that jurors tend to be less 
suspicious of witnesses who share their identity and more skeptical of 
those who do not.96 This effect was particularly pronounced for white 
 
these courtroom actors to engage in triage—the process of allocating scarce 
resources.”). 
88. Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 229. 
89. Alford, supra note 39, at 345; see also id. (discussing other studies that 
reveal the stereotypical association of Black people with violence and 
hostility, a stereotype that “is associated with fear and loathing” and is 
“likely to be a strong motivating force” when activated through racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric in closing argument). 
90. Hunt, supra note 18, at 275. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1262. 
94. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, 
and Misremembering, 57 Duke L.J. 345, 376 (2007). 
95. Id. at 376–77. 
96. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1262. 
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jurors being skeptical of the credibility of Black witnesses, including 
white jurors who reported low levels of prejudice.97 Researchers linked 
this skepticism to stereotypes of Black dishonesty.98 
3. Priming for Prejudice 
Additionally, understanding how racist prosecutorial rhetoric works 
requires understanding the related concepts of prejudice and priming. 
“[P]rejudice involves negative attitudes or evaluations (e.g., feelings of 
dislike) toward a social category.”99 Much of the recent implicit bias 
research focuses on how these negative attitudes are activated through 
“priming,” which involves presenting information in ways that trigger 
associations with other ideas.100 Our brains interpret new information 
by fitting it into existing categories, particularly categories that have 
been recently accessed, and “[p]riming is a way of influencing the 
categories that are at the forefront of our brains.”101 
In experimental research studies using priming, researchers expose 
participants to stimuli and then measure their responses. 102  For 
example, studies show differences in voting patterns depending on the 
location of the voting place (e.g. higher approval of school bonds when 
voting in a school rather than another location) and higher reports of 
conservative social attitudes when questioned about these attitudes in 
front of a cathedral versus a government building.103 In many priming 
studies, however, participants are unaware of the “primes” because they 
are flashed on a screen too quickly to be consciously perceived.104 Even 
 
97. Id. 
98. See id. at 1261–62. 
99. Hunt, supra note 18, at 275. Hunt distinguishes between prejudice, which 
is always negative, and stereotyping, which can be positive or negative, as 
explained above. Id. 
100. Linda L. Berger & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Legal Persuasion: A 
Rhetorical Approach to the Science 105 (2018); see also id. at 107 
(noting that our brains have so many categories in them but tend to use 
categories that were recently activated when processing new information). 
101. Id.; see also Karenna F. Malavanti, Megan K. Johnson, Wade C. Rowatt 
& Charles A. Weaver, III, Subtle Contextual Influences on Racial Bias in 
the Courtroom, 24 Am. Soc’y Trial Consultants 2, 5 (2012) (defining 
priming as “the unconscious influence of individuals’ environmental cues 
on their behaviors.”). 
102. See Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Koichi Hioki, Race and Retribution: 
An Empirical Study of Implicit Bias and Punishment in America, 53 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 839, 873 (2019). 
103. Malavanti et al., supra note 101, at 4. 
104. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 1248 (“If people are shown an image on a 
screen for a few milliseconds, followed immediately by a ‘masking’ image, 
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when participants were unaware of the stimuli, those stimuli con–
sistently produced prejudiced results involving both attitudes and 
decision-making.105 
For example, social science research shows that priming for race 
can affect interpretation of ambiguous facts. 106  In one study, the 
researcher “presented a set of ambiguous facts to participants after 
priming them with stereotypes of African Americans,” then asked them 
to judge the person’s ambiguous behavior.107 “Participants who were 
primed with more [negative] stereotypes judged the person’s ambiguous 
behavior more harshly than participants who were primed with fewer 
stereotypes.”108 
Similarly, a recent empirical study by Professor Justin Levinson 
showed that race sometimes affects how jurors remember facts.109 In 
that study, “for some facts, simply altering a legal actor’s race caused 
participants to remember certain facts or generate false memories in 
racially biased ways.”110 Study participants read a “confrontation” story 
describing circumstances surrounding a fistfight, were then given a 
short distracting task, and then were asked questions about their 
memories of the story.111 The facts of the story were identical except for 
the race of the protagonist: “participants read about either William, a 
Caucasian man, Tyronne, an African-American man, or Kawika, a 
Hawaiian man.”112 
 
they will behave in ways that reflect their having seen the first image, but 
without any conscious awareness of having seen it . . . .”). 
105. See, e.g., Anders Kaye, Schematic Psychology and Criminal Responsibility, 
83 St. John’s L. Rev. 565, 577 (2009) (summarizing priming studies); see 
also Wilkins, supra note 69, at 322 (quoting Justin D. Levinson, Race, 
Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DePaul L. Rev. 599, 632 (2009)) 
(brackets in original) (noting that priming one stereotype of a group can 
activate other stereotypes as well: “For example, a group primed with 
violent rap music, which primed stereotypes of black males as aggressive 
and violent, ‘were more likely than other participants to judge a Black job 
applicant as less qualified for a job requiring intelligence’ [lower intelligence 
being another stereotype pertaining to blacks].”). 
106. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1267–71. 
107. Id. at 1267–68. 
108. Id. 
109. Levinson, supra note 94, at 350.  
110. Id. at 351. 
111. Id. at 391. 
112. Id. at 394. Levinson also used the same methodology with a story involving 
an employment dispute. Id. “Participants exhibited better memories for the 
employment scenario than for [t]he [c]onfrontation,” perhaps because the 
confrontation story “contained more racially stereotypical facts.” Id. at 402–
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With this one change, Levinson found multiples ways in which 
“[s]ystematic errors in recall affected participants’ memories of [t]he 
[c]onfrontation in a manner harmful to African Americans, and to a 
lesser extent, to Hawaiians.” 113  For example, participants more 
successfully recalled “aggressive facts” when they read about Tyronne 
as compared to William.114 The study also showed a “false memory 
effect” for one fact related to aggression, with more participants who 
read about people of color falsely remembering a “fact” about the 
person’s aggression.115 And while Levinson did not find statistically 
significant differences in recall of mitigation facts for those reading 
about William compared to Tyronne, he did find that those who read 
about Kawika were more likely to falsely remember mitigating facts.116 
Levinson’s research is consistent with earlier studies outside the 
race context that indicate that rhetorical choices about language can 
similarly affect memory. Multiple studies of memory demonstrated that 
people given information about a car accident remembered the car going 
significantly faster when the accident description used the word 
“smashed” compared to “contacted” or “hit.”117 And when asked a week 
later whether the accident scene photos had included broken glass, 
those who had seen the word “smashed” were more likely to falsely 
remember the presence of broken glass.118 
Emotions also play a significant role in priming for retribution. 
“When a decision-maker feels fear, anger, or both, the need for 
retribution automatically becomes heightened.”119 Fear and anger are 
 
03. In other words, the memory effects link back to stereotype consistency 
discussed in the prior section. 
113. Id. at 398 (emphasis omitted). 
114. Id. at 398–99. 
115. Id. at 400–01 (while 56% of participants who read about William falsely 
remembered a fact showing William as the aggressor, that number rose to 
70% for those reading about Tyronne or Kawika). 
116. Id. at 401. These memory biases seem to operate unconsciously; Levinson 
noted that “participants who manifested more memory bias were not more 
likely to be explicitly biased.” Id. at 404. However, he found one example 
where that was not true—one instance where participants who read about 
William and had higher explicit bias and higher memory bias. Id. at 406 
n.284. He also found two counterintuitive examples, where participants who 
read about Tyronne or Kawika were actually more likely to misremember 
if they had low levels of explicit bias. Id. at 404. 
117. Godsey, supra note 83, at 121. 
118. Id. at 121–22. That was true even if at the time they had not incorrectly 
inflated the car’s speed after seeing that characterization. Id. at 122. 
119. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 854; see also Berger & Stanchi, 
supra note 100, at 110 (noting that “when [someone] experiences anger, . 
. . the emotion tends to reinforce the desire to blame someone, anyone,” 
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both intensified by racial stereotypes. 120  Stereotypes also lessen 
empathy, particularly when connected to dehumanization.121 Dehum–
anization occurs when people view other people “as less than human 
and thus not deserving of moral consideration.”122 “As a matter of 
history, social fact[,] and even neuroscience . . . people tend to react 
to criminals by dehumanizing them.”123 This dehumanization makes 
people more likely to justify violence. For example, one study showed 
that when participants were primed with the word “ape,” they were 
more likely to conclude that use of force was justified in a video showing 
police officers severely and repeatedly striking a Black suspect after the 
conclusion of a car chase.124 
Dehumanizing rhetoric can play an important role in priming for 
emotion, with devastating consequences. For instance, our current 
mass-incarceration epidemic was shaped in part by “pundits and 
professors alike warning . . . of a ‘new breed’ of merciless juvenile 
‘superpredators’ and the horrors of ‘crack babies.’”125 Levinson argues 
that this dehumanizing rhetoric played on fear and anger in a racialized 
way, creating a “moral panic” that has led to hundreds of thousands of 
Americans imprisoned for decades “based on baseless legislative 
assumptions.”126 
 
while sadness tends to make people “attribute the events that occurred to 
the overall situation rather than to human actions”). 
120. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 868. 
121. Id. at 868–69. 
122. Godsey, supra note 83, at 39 (internal quotation omitted). Godsey notes 
that dehumanizing racial slurs helped slave-owners justify their actions 
and that both sides in World War II used racial slurs in propaganda. Id. 
“Racism in any form involves dehumanization.” Id. 
123. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 869. There is a broader issue with 
prosecutors’ offices having a culture that dehumanizes criminal defendants 
that prosecutors should take seriously. See, e.g., Godsey, supra note 83, 
at 39–52 (describing personal experience as both a prosecutor and as an 
attorney on an innocence project facing dehumanization of criminal 
defendants). 
124. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 869–70. 
125. Id. at 843. While that rhetoric is not as explicitly dehumanizing as directly 
calling someone an ape, words like “breed” and “superpredator” invoke 
animal imagery. See also Berger & Stanchi, supra note 100, at 45 (discus–
sing the “superpredator” metaphor and the briefs in a recent Supreme Court 
case demonstrating that the superpredator metaphor was also myth). 
126. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 843. This analysis came from an article 
discussing Levinson’s recent study showing that race and retribution have 
become inextricably linked. “The study found that participants more 
strongly associated Black faces with the concepts of retribution, payback, 
and revenge, and White faces with the concepts of rehabilitation, treatment, 
and redemption.” Id. at 844; see also Lee, supra note 33, at 863–66 (summar–
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Regarding criminal trials, one scholar notes that prosecutors “from 
the time of Cicero until the present” have used the technique of 
“othering” defendants “as someone outside of the moral community” to 
“induce a negative emotional response towards the defendant.”127 This 
technique also plays on jurors’ emotions by situating the prosecutor on 
the same side of the moral line as the jurors, which helps the jury see 
the prosecutor as trustworthy.128 Modern cognitive psychology research 
thus confirms the insights of early rhetoricians about how othering and 
stereotyping affects perception.129 
The role of rhetoric in priming to activate stereotypes is significant, 
as research on implicit bias indicates that something is needed to trigger 
the power of a stereotype for people who do not harbor explicit biases.130 
The “existence of stereotypes or caricatures in the mind of the audience 
is often not enough to produce the motivating response. Rather, the 
speaker may need to shape his discourse to call forth these cognitive 
constructs in the minds of the listeners.”131 
But the prosecutor’s language doesn’t have to directly refer to a 
stereotype to activate the juror’s mental association. For example, a 
prosecutor could refer to the defendant’s actions, rather than the 
defendant himself, as “animalistic, brutal, and impulsive[,]” which will 
“bring forth the caricature in the minds of the jurors whose mental 
models of Black people include this stereotype.”132  Similarly, pros–
ecutors can evoke this stereotype through verbs commonly associated 
with animals, such as “hunt” or “pounce.”133 Other words associated 
with animals can have a similar effect, such as “prey,” or “jungle.”134 
Additionally, prosecutors can associate defendants with people 
commonly associated with Black violence, for example invoking O.J. 
Simpson “since Simpson has become an avatar of the [b]rute caricature 
 
izing research showing a connection between information about race of 
offenders and support for punitive measures in the criminal justice system). 
127. Alford, supra note 39, at 335 (footnote omitted). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 336. 
130. See, e.g., id. at 347 (“[A] stereotype, which lies latent in the mind of its 
adherent, does not have a force of its own. The appropriate stimulus is 
often required to elicit the stereotype . . . .”). 
131. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Prasad, supra note 49, at 3101 (“[J]urors’ 
implicit biases must be triggered before they can adversely affect a defendant’s 
trial.”). 
132. Alford, supra note 39, at 349 (footnote omitted). 
133. Heller, supra note 19, at 880. 
134. Id. 
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in the White community.”135 References to neighborhoods or physical 
characteristics like hairstyles can also evoke stereotypes. 136  Finally, 
stereotypes can even be activated through what sounds like a disavowal, 
such as when a prosecutor says “[r]ace has nothing . . . to do with this 
case” before making an argument that appeals to racial stereotypes.137 
4. Framing and Recency Bias 
Racist prosecutorial rhetoric can affect the jury regardless of when 
it happens at trial; however, the “order and context in which people 
encounter new information” can play a crucial role in the way that 
information is understood and remembered.138 
Much of the scholarship on racist prosecutorial rhetoric focuses on 
closing arguments, also called summations. 139  That scholarship 
emphasizes the important role that closing arguments play, particularly 
given the greater narrative freedom in these arguments.140 Scholars 
often note the importance of the prosecutor getting the last word141 and 
that courts impose relatively few constraints on closing arguments.142 
This focus on closing arguments is supported by psychological research 
on “recency effect,” which involves a focus on the most recent 
information presented.143 “Recency effects arise when a fact-finder is 
 
135. Alford, supra note 39, at 352. 
136. Id. at 353. 
137. See, e.g., id. at 356 (quoting Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 99 (3d Cir. 
2001)). Alford notes that reviewing courts generally take these arguments at 
face value, as being a disavowal of the role of race in decision-making, rather 
than recognizing the use of a rhetorical device to activate racial biases; see 
also id. at 357–59; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 
67 Tul. L. Rev. 1739, 1752 (1993) (quoting State v. Snowden, 675 P.2d 
289, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)) (describing a case where the prosecutor said 
“I don’t mean to be racial about this . . . do you think you’re going to leave 
a [B]lack guy out there in a car, or a big car while a robbery is going on?”). 
138. Mark Spottswood, Ordering Proof: Beyond Adversarial and Inquisitorial 
Trial Structures, 83 Tenn. L. Rev. 291, 293 (2015). 
139. See generally Bowman, supra note 16, at 342–45 (synthesizing various 
sources on prosecutorial closing arguments). 
140. See, e.g., Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in 
Closing Argument: An Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 Ohio 
N.U. L. Rev. 67, 73–74 (2001) (illustrating that closing arguments are 
cabined only by a prohibition on appealing to the “passion or prejudice” 
of the jury). 
141. See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 
27 Am. J. Crim. L. 139, 146–56 (2000) (discussing various studies about the 
importance of closing argument in juror decision-making). 
142. Alford, supra note 39, at 329. 
143. See Spottswood, supra note 138, at 294. 
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presented with voluminous, challenging evidence, and they must make 
an immediate decision following trial.”144 This research suggests that 
comments in closing arguments are likely to have outsized significance 
compared to comments in the middle of the trial. And rebuttal closing 
arguments may be particularly problematic, given that defense counsel 
has no opportunity to respond.145 
In addition to the recency effect, the research on priming 
demonstrates the importance of comments made early in the trial, such 
as during opening statements or voir dire. In some contexts, the 
research demonstrates “primacy effect,” which is the tendency for the 
first piece of information to shape understanding and memory of 
subsequent information.146 “Once people have an impression or belief, 
they are inclined to pay less attention to subsequent information, 
particularly information that contradicts the impression.”147 Advocates 
can shape this impression through framing, which is “a process whereby 
communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point 
of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted 
by others in a particular manner.”148 Advocates use framing techniques 
when articulating trial themes at the beginning of a case and shape 
their case presentation and arguments around those themes. Framing 
and priming are closely related, as they both relate to making “certain 
information more salient or accessible.”149 
Context affects whether primacy or recency is more important to 
particular decisions,150 but the details of the conflicting studies are not 
crucial here. Instead, the key idea is that racist prosecutorial rhetoric 
in voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments all can have a 
significant effect on how jurors understand and evaluate criminal cases, 
and these effects are generally subconscious rather than conscious. 
 
144. Id. 
145. See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, Combating Prosecutorial Misconduct in 
Closing Arguments, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 887, 909 (2018) (discussing the need 
for trial courts to step in when improper arguments are made in rebuttal 
closing). 
146. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the 
Science of First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 Or. L. Rev. 305, 
346 (2010). 
147. Berger & Stanchi, supra note 100, at 118. 
148. Hyatt Browning Shirkey, Last Attorney to the Jury Box Is A Rotten Egg: 
Overcoming Psychological Hurdles in the Order of Presentation at Trial, 8 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 581, 585 (2011). 
149. Berger & Stanchi, supra note 100, at 129. 
150. Stanchi, supra note 146, at 347. 
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5. Neuroscience and Neurorhetoric 
Neuroscience and the emerging discipline of neurorhetoric help 
provide a biological explanation for the power of stereotypes and coded 
language. Neuroscience is the study of the organization and functions 
of the brain.151 Neuroscience studies help confirm the results of social 
psychological studies of race152 and explain how brain functions lead to 
the results observed in psychological studies.153 While some have argued 
that reliance on neuroscience creates a risk of biologizing racism, and 
thereby removing it from its historical and social contexts,154 others 
emphasize the importance of examining the complexity of the various 
factors that influence racism. 155  “[N]euroscience explains that when 
rhetoric influences us, it does so in an embodied way, triggering 
electrochemical reactions that traverse our neural pathways, beyond 
the purview of our conscious thought.”156 Neurorhetoric thus builds on 
neuroscience to explain how racist rhetoric physically effects the human 
brain.157 
Scholarship on racism and neuroscience often emphasizes the role 
of the amygdala, a region of the brain associated with fear and the 
fight-or-flight reaction.158 Neuroscientific studies on racial biases show 
activation of the subject’s amygdala when exposed to racialized stimuli, 
perhaps because the racialized stimuli leads the person to perceive a 
threat. 159  Out-group association can also cause activation of the 
amygdala: “Where a person’s identity is of an out-group to our own 
 
151. Anna Spain Bradley, The Disruptive Neuroscience of Judicial Choice, 9 U.C. 
Irvine L. Rev. 1, 20 (2018). 
152. Steven A. Ramirez & Neil G. Williams, On the Permanence of Racial 
Injustice and the Possibility of Deracialization, 69 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 
299, 325 (2018). 
153. Bradley, supra note 151, at 18. 
154. Jonathan Kahn, Pills for Prejudice: Implicit Bias and Technical Fix for 
Racism, 43 Am. J.L. & Med. 263, 265, 271 (2017). 
155. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the Left, 54 St. 
Louis U. L.J. 1139, 1147 (2010) (suggesting that to understand racialization, 
one needs multiple levels of analysis from different perspectives). 
156. Jewel, supra note 18, at 663. 
157. Id. “Whereas cognitive rhetoric might be conceived as the study of how 
persuasion works in the mind, neurorhetoric looks at how persuasion works 
in a biological sense, in the brain.” Id. at 669 (emphasis omitted). 
158. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 151, at 28 (discussing the high importance 
of amygdala among neuroscience researchers). 
159. See Christian M. Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical 
Decision-Making in the Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47 
Gonz. L. Rev. 319, 328 (2011); Ramirez & Williams, supra note 152, at 
325–26. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial 
65 
and one that has historically or culturally been associated with negative 
traits, we process such perceptions and biases in our amygdala, which 
is where we also process fear.”160 Activation of the amygdala also affects 
memory, causing heightened attention to some details at the expense 
of other details.161 
However, the amygdala is not the only part of the brain relevant 
to understanding racism. Decision-making involves multiple regions of 
the brain, sometimes operating sequentially and sometimes operating 
simultaneously.162 These “various regions of our brain, and [the] neural 
circuitry that connects them, engage in cross-talk when we decide, make 
a choice, or change our mind.”163 Activity in one part of the brain can 
thus affect another part, such as when emotional rhetoric leads to the 
release of chemical reactions that dampen the prefrontal cortex that 
controls higher-order thinking.164 
This research also helps explain the formation and power of 
stereotypes. For example, “neuroscience demonstrates that the 
amygdala activity requires social conditioning from a young 
age . . . [which] suggests that racial responses are learned respon–
ses.” 165  Relatedly, neuroscience helps explain the development of 
racially coded associations, as our “[c]ulture can produce unified 
categories that function as metaphorical ‘code’ for more implicit con–
cepts.”166 References to concepts trigger the majoritarian cultural values 
associated with those concepts. 167  Repetition, a common rhetorical 
technique, entrenches these neural pathways, making it smoother and 
faster “for a conclusory message to reach an individual’s consciousness” 
and creating more certainty in the associated belief.168 Thus, repeated 
cultural references to coded categories “encourage rapid unconscious 
 
160. Bradley, supra note 42, at 31. 
161. Halliburton, supra note 159, at 325. 
162. Bradley, supra note 151, at 23. Bradley notes that psychologist Daniel 
Kahneman popularized these concepts through his explanation of System 1 
thought as quick and automatic, with System 2 thought being slower and 
more complex. Id. 
163. Id. at 26–27. 
164. Jewel, supra note 18, at 673. For a more detailed discussion of the role of 
emotion in decision-making, see Bradley, supra note 151, at 29–36. Bradley 
notes that emotion related to what is being decided can be helpful, while 
unrelated emotion can be a distraction, id. at 34, and that emotion can both 
help and hinder “normatively correct responses,” id. at 36 (quotation 
omitted). 
165. Ramirez & Williams, supra note 152, at 326–27 (footnote omitted). 
166. Jewel, supra note 18, at 667. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 664. 
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thinking that has the effect of hardwiring stereotypes into the pathways 
of the brain.”169 
Professor Lucille Jewel’s article on neurorhetoric applies these 
concepts to explain the effectiveness of the Nazi rhetoric dehumanizing 
Jewish people. 170  She noted that Nazi propaganda activated and 
deepened entrenched neural pathways, reinforcing majoritarian cultural 
values and “a sense of commonality in the face of threat.”171 At the 
same time, the emotional component of the propaganda hindered 
activation of higher-order thinking and instead anesthetized Germans 
to the realities of human suffering.172 
She also explains how the “welfare queen” stereotype popularized 
in the United States in the 1980s was coded language that unconsciously 
activated a variety of negative stereotypes.173 The welfare queen image 
likely “triggered concomitant firings in various neural pathways related 
to concepts as disparate as women, good and bad mothers, the implicit 
bias against African Americans, visualized luxury automobiles, and 
moral verdicts.”174 As a result of the repeated use of the welfare queen 
metaphor, Americans’ view of welfare shifted from a helpful safety net 
protecting vulnerable children into a “racialized locus of fraud and 
immorality.”175  These two examples help demonstrate the powerful 
impact of racially coded language on perception and decision-making.176 
6. Group Decision-Making Can Help But Does Not                     
Cure Individual Biases 
Some may expect that group decision-making, like that involved in 
jury deliberations, would cure at least some types of individual biases. 
With respect to memory errors, however, Levinson concluded that jury 
deliberations likely preserve rather than challenge individual memory 
errors.177 Studies on jury deliberations show that jurors try to agree on 
a common narrative through a combination of “rational persuasion, 
sheer social pressure, and the psychological mechanism by which 
 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 675–76. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 677–78. 
174. Id. at 678. 
175. Id. 
176. Although Jewel’s analysis may seem bleak, she concludes her article by 
offering more hopeful prescriptions about how these toxic neural pathways 
can be overcome, as discussed infra at notes 356, 360, and accompanying 
text. 
177. Levinson, supra note 94, at 387–88. 
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individual perceptions undergo change when exposed to group 
discussion.”178 During this process, the most vocal jurors do not always 
have the most accurate memories, and the likelihood of jurors changing 
their verdict depends more on their confidence in their memories rather 
than the accuracy of those memories.179 Therefore, the evidence that 
jury deliberation improves memories is at best weak.180 Furthermore, 
vocal jurors can use improper closing arguments as “ammunition” in 
the jury room to help persuade other jurors,181 so jury deliberations can 
amplify rather than minimize the effect of individual biases. 
Research does suggest, however, that diversity in jury composition 
can affect jury deliberations in positive ways.182 One study suggests that 
lawyers are less likely to appeal to stereotypes when arguing to a diverse 
jury.183 But even if jury diversity doesn’t change attorney behavior, 
several studies show that increased jury diversity improves decision-
making.184 
One study found that compared “with all-White juries, the diverse 
juries discussed the case longer, considered more of the evidence, and 
were more accurate in their discussion of that evidence.” 185 That study 
also indicated that diverse juries were more likely to discuss the 
potential impact of the defendant’s race on the case, with both Black 
and white participants engaging in that conversation:186  
Perhaps the most important insight from the study was that the 
more intense deliberation was not the result of African American 
jurors contributing different perspectives, but it was the result of 
White jurors who acted differently, more conscious, in the 
 
178. Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 Geo. L.J. 281, 327 (2013) 
(quoting Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 489 
(1966)). 
179. Levinson, supra note 94, at 389 (discussing Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. 
Keenan, Does Jury Deliberation Really Improve Jurors’ Memories?, 16 
Applied Cognitive Psych. 589, 600 (2002)). 
180. Id. 
181. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 892. 
182. Hunt, supra note 18, at 274 (“[B]iases in jury decision making often occur 
in response to the interaction of races among trial parties, not the race of a 
single party.”). Much scholarly work is being done on the Batson issue. See, 
e.g., sources cited supra note 33. However, the Batson issue is generally 
beyond the scope of this article. 
183. Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 236. 
184. Id. (summarizing studies). 
185. Hunt, supra note 18, at 279. 
186. Id.  
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presence of other diverse jurors, presumably because they did not 
want to appear biased.187  
That research connects to the Aversive Racism Theory mentioned 
above, which indicates that jurors do a better job of guarding against 
the influence of prejudice when they see race as salient.188 The presence 
of jurors of color may implicitly make race salient for white jurors, 
“reminding them of their egalitarianism and thereby decreasing their 
biases.”189 This research shows that diverse juries are one tool that can 
help minimize the impact of biases; other tools are discussed in more 
detail below in Part III(C). 
II. Courts’ Current Approaches Are Ineffective at 
Dealing with Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial 
Current law fails to prevent racist prosecutorial rhetoric or ade–
quately deal with it when it occurs. Section A shows that prosecutors 
are using racist prosecutorial rhetoric. Section B shows that courts deny 
that even explicitly racist language has racialized meaning, while 
Section C describes the procedural devices that appellate courts use to 
uphold convictions. 
A. Prosecutors Use Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric 
The sections above introduced the backdrop of how race can affect 
criminal trials generally and how racist rhetoric can exacerbate these 
underlying issues of racialized decision-making. This section illustrates 
how recent cases demonstrate that prosecutors use these racist themes 
and images in seeking convictions.190 The cases discussed below show a 
wide variety of ways that prosecutors’ racist rhetoric invoke stereotypes 
or otherwise prime the jury to decide based on racial prejudices. 
While most of the cases below contain more subtle references, some 
relatively recent cases involve explicitly racist language and argu–
 
187. Selmi, supra note 26, at 229. 
188. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
189. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1701; see also Liana Peter-Hagene, Jurors’ 
Cognitive Depletion and Performance During Jury Deliberation as a Function 
of Jury Diversity and Defendant Race, 43 L. & Hum. Behav. 232, 234 (2019) 
(“Specifically, people might become [cognitively] depleted when they engage 
in interracial interactions, but these interactions might also provide the very 
impetus needed for people to become aware of, and motivated to avoid, racial 
bias.”). 
190. This section focuses on the prosecutor’s arguments in cases within the last 
twenty-five years, without regard to what the reviewing courts thought of 
them, a topic discussed in Sections B and C below. 
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ments.191 For example, the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1996 analyzed 
a case in which the prosecutor used the n-word repeatedly in discussing 
the motive for the crime.192 The Alabama Supreme Court concluded 
that the motive argument would have been fine without the “emotion–
ally charged racial slur.”193 A more recent Seventh Circuit case upheld 
a defendant’s conviction for shooting three police officers when the 
prosecutor asked several witnesses about whether defendant’s beliefs 
“as a [B]lack Muslim” provided a motive to shoot the officers that would 
overcome his insanity defense.194 
More commonly, appellate cases involve animal imagery.195 For 
example, prosecutors in California often compare criminal defendants 
to a “Bengal Tiger,” an analogy built on the idea that Bengal tigers 
seem docile in captivity but indiscriminately kill in the wild.196 “In 
California, the use of this story is not limited to one or two counties, or 
one or two prosecutors. It has been used all over the state.” 197 
Additionally, a 2016 case from the Fourth Circuit discussed a death 
penalty sentencing hearing in which the prosecutor argued that giving 
the defendant a life sentence rather than the death penalty would allow 
for him to “come back out. Meeting him again will be like meeting King 
 
191. For a summary of older cases on this topic, see S. Johnson, supra note 137, 
at 1754 & nn.57–59. Of course, reasonable people can disagree on where to 
draw the line between “blatant” racist arguments and more subtle ones. Id. 
at 1760–61. 
192. Ivery v. State, 686 So.2d 495, 504–05 (Ala. 1996). The prosecutor also used 
a variant of the n-word, “n*****itious,” to refer to hatred of Black people. 
The prosecutor and the Alabama Supreme Court opinion spelled both words 
out rather than using the asterisks. While the prosecutor used these words 
in prosecuting what appears to be a hate crime against a person of color by 
a white person, rather than using it against a Black defendant, prosecutors’ 
use of this language raise a variety of concerns. See infra Section III(B) for 
more on why prosecutors should be held to a higher standard than defense 
counsel. 
193. Id. at 505. Jeff Sessions was the Alabama Attorney General at the time 
Alabama defended this conviction. Id. at 498. 
194. Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 2000). The court concluded 
that these were proper questions even though every witness asked denied 
this possible motive and “characterized black Muslims as peaceful and law-
abiding citizens.” Id. at 831. 
195. For examples of older cases using animal imagery see Johnson, supra note 
137, at 1753–54. 
196. Heller, supra note 19, at 870–71. 
197. Id. at 877, 883 (quoting People v. Duncan, 810 P.2d 131, 143 (1991)) (noting 
that it has been used since the mid-1990s in capital cases in at least six counties 
and that the California Supreme Court has “unequivocally” upheld the 
practice, concluding that it “does not [necessarily] invoke racial overtones”). 
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Kong on a bad day.”198 The prosecutor also labeled the defendant as a 
“monster,” a “big old tiger,” and “the beast of burden.”199 Prosecutors 
use a variety of other animal images as well, such as calling a group of 
defendants “a pack of wolves” or individual defendants “a punk thug 
dog” or “a snake [who] slithers on his underbelly.”200 
Prosecutors also find a variety of other ways to invoke racialized 
stereotypes. For example, an Idaho case in 2014 involved a prosecutor 
singing a few lines of “the Dixie song[,] Right? Oh, I wish I was in the 
land of cotton. Good times not forgotten.”201 Another case involved 
repeated references to “the white lady” and comments about the Black 
defendant’s vulgar sexual comments to her, even though the case 
involved justifiable homicide in a later altercation far removed from the 
“white lady.”202 Another prosecutor repeatedly said “po-leese” instead 
of “police” to call attention to the defendant’s race in connection with 
an argument about an alleged Black anti-snitching code and stated that 
“black folk don’t testify against black folk.”203 In another case, the pros–
ecutor twice referred to defendants as “bad people.”204 After the trial 
court overruled an objection, the prosecutor escalated the argument: 
“There are bad people in the world, ladies and gentlemen. We are lucky 
where we live not to come into contact with as many as there may be 
in other parts of the country. But there are still some around here.”205 
Prosecutors sometimes invoke these stereotypes while simultaneously 
denying that they are doing so, such as by saying: “Well, we know what 
that’s a code word for. He’s a big, strong, [B]lack man, but he’s a rough 
character. Members of the [j]ury, this is not about race.”206 
 
198. Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 324 (4th Cir. 2016). 
199. Id. 
200. Heller, supra note 19, at 878–80 nn.53–70 and accompanying text (including 
these and other animal images). 
201. State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 1213, 1215 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). 
202. Wallace v. State, 768 So.2d 1247, 1249–50 (Fla. 2000). Although, the actions 
toward the white woman led to the altercation, the court indicated that 
race should not be considered in making the determination of culpability at 
the time of the shooting. 
203. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 553–54, 557 (Wash. 2011). 
204. United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996). 
205. Id. 
206. State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2005) (underscoring that the 
prosecutor’s argument in that case was particularly appalling because he 
was suggesting that defense counsel was making a racial argument when 
that was not the case); see also State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 620 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 2002) (prosecutor stated “[r]ace has nothing to do with this case. 
In fact, as [the victim] said, her son is half black; her boyfriend was black.”); 
Cole v. State, 399 P.3d 618, 620 (Wyo. 2017) (prosecutor argued in rebuttal 
closing that “an African-American man in Wyoming is still not allowed to 
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Sexual assault cases provide a particularly common setting for 
racist rhetoric, especially language that suggests that the crime is worse 
because of the race of the perpetrator.207 Prosecutors sometimes bring 
in references to skin color in these cases, with weak pretexts as to why 
skin color is relevant.208 The prosecutor in one case made repeated 
references to the victim being a local Hawaiian girl who began to be 
afraid when “she sees that there are six African-American males in the 
room.”209 Another prosecutor stated that it is “every mother’s night–
mare” to find “some black, military guy on top of your daughter.”210 By 
calling attention to race in these cases, the prosecutors subtly—or not 
so subtly—invoked the emotion surrounding the stereotype of Black 
men being sexually predatory towards white women.211 
B. Appellate Courts Often Refuse to Recognize Improper Language 
Although prosecutors use racist prosecutorial rhetoric, appellate 
courts often fail to recognize much of that rhetoric as racist, or even 
more generically improper.212 In doing so, courts’ reasoning is strained 
 
steal a car and take the police on a high-speed chase. It doesn’t matter what 
race he is. A white person is not allowed to do that either.”). In repeating 
the references to race, the prosecutor called attention to race while formally 
arguing that it was irrelevant. See Alford, supra note 39, at 357–59 
(regarding why that approach invokes stereotypes). 
207. For example, the case in which the prosecutor sang the lines of the “Dixie 
song” referring to cotton involved sexual assault of a minor. State v. Kirk, 
339 P.3d 1213, 1215 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). “We agree that the racial 
reference here was indirect and perhaps innocently made.” Id. at 1217. 
However, the court emphasized that the effect on the jury was more 
important than prosecutorial intent. Id. 
208. People v. Robinson, 454 P.3d 229, 231 (Colo. 2019), cert. denied, 2020 WL 
5882233 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020) (No. 19-1218) (prosecutor made graphic com–
ments about rape victim’s pasty white skin color and seeing a black penis). 
209. State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 610 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis 
omitted). The victim’s fear might have come from being outnumbered, but 
the race of the men outnumbering her should not have sparked that fear, 
as the prosecutor suggested. See id. 
210. State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Haw. 1999). 
211. For a discussion of stereotypes related to sexuality, see Cornel West, 
Race Matters 86–87 (1993). 
212. Of course, appellate courts do sometimes appropriately recognize and reject 
racist prosecutorial rhetoric. See, e.g., Kirk, 339 P.3d at 1216 (“‘Dixie’ was 
an anthem of the Confederacy, an ode to the Old South, which references 
with praise a time and place of the most pernicious racism. The prosecutor’s 
mention of the title, ‘Dixie,’ as well as the specific lyrics recited by the 
prosecutor, referring to ‘the land of cotton,’ expressly evoke that setting with 
all its racial overtones.”). In United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064 
(8th Cir. 2000), the court noted that the prosecutor repeatedly argued that 
the defendant was lying because he “is here under fraudulent and illegal 
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in a variety of ways, from affirmatively endorsing arguments as proper 
to minimizing their impropriety. 
Courts sometimes affirmatively justify even explicitly racist 
rhetoric. For example, the California Supreme Court found “no impro–
priety in the argument” based on the Bengal tiger analogy described 
above.213 The prosecutor in one California case described going to the 
San Diego Zoo and seeing “a Bengal tiger in captivity, behind bars, and 
is being fed so much meat every day” and “looking like [a] kitten[].”214 
The prosecutor then contrasted the Bengal tiger in captivity with one 
“in its natural habitat” behind a palm frond in India or Pakistan, then 
immediately shifted to talking about the defendant: “If you were there 
that night, you wouldn’t see the defendant in his suit, the way you have 
seen him in this trial. You would see him with a butcher knife, out to 
get money. You would be seeing him in a very natural habitat.”215 The 
California Supreme Court justified this argument in two different ways. 
First, the court concluded that the “prosecutor was attempting to focus 
the jury’s attention on the vicious nature of the crime” and was entitled 
to argue “that modest behavior in the courtroom was not inconsistent 
with violent conduct under other less structured and controlled 
circumstances.”216 The court also rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the Bengal tiger analogy was racist: “Likening a vicious murderer 
to a wild animal does not invoke racial overtones. Indeed, the circum–
stances of the murder might have justified even more opprobrious 
epithets.”217 That case is not an outlier; California courts use that 
reasoning repeatedly, including a nearly identical version in a more 
recent California Supreme Court opinion.218 
 
circumstances, and as such, he is basically from day to day living a lie” which 
made “lying and deceiving to Mr. Cruz-Padilla not something that is hard 
to do or out of the ordinary.” Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d at 1068. The court 
concluded that the prosecutor crossed the line by emphasizing emotion 
rather than evidence and that the “government’s repeated references to 
Cruz-Padilla’s [immigration] status reinforced to the jury his foreign origin 
and contributed nothing of a legitimate evidentiary value.” Id. at 1069. 
213. People v. Duncan, 810 P.2d 131, 142 (Cal. 1991); see also Heller, supra note 
19, at 883. 
214. Duncan, 810 P.2d at 142. 
215. Id. The prosecutor’s next sentence was about the overwhelming evidence 
of the defendant’s guilt. Id. 
216. Id. at 142–43. 
217. Id. at 143. 
218. People v. Brady, 236 P.3d 312, 342 (2010) (adding “necessarily” to the idea 
that wild animal comparisons are not racial and concluding that prosecutors 
are entitled to argue that docile behavior in the courtroom is not inconsistent 
with murdering someone). The courts’ reasoning in these cases fails to 
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Similarly, state courts in South Carolina concluded that comparing 
a defendant to King Kong was an appropriate reference to the 
defendant’s size and strength.219 The court similarly concluded that 
calling the defendant, Bennett, a “caveman” was “merely descriptive” 
of testimony that Bennett had pulled someone by the hair twice.220 The 
court acknowledged that the King Kong reference “could have racial 
connotations” but still “was not an appeal to the passions or prejudices 
of the jury.” 221  The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Bennett’s habeas 
proceeding explained the flaws in this reasoning, noting that throughout 
history, Black people “have been appallingly disparaged as primates or 
members of a subhuman species in some lesser state of evolution.”222 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the prosecutor thus encouraged the 
jury to view Bennett as less human because of his race.223 The Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis reflects the social science research described above, 
but it came in an opinion issued sixteen years after the hearing in which 
the prosecutor made these arguments.224 In another case, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia, a federal district court, and the Eleventh Circuit all 
failed to acknowledge the racial significance of the prosecutor calling 
the defendant “a mad dog” even though that “characterization 
implicated all three of the key definitions of the brute [stereotype]: a 
mad dog is an animal that is also brutally violent, incapable of thought, 
and acts completely on impulse.”225 
 
account for the longstanding stereotype associating Black people with 
animals. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
219. State v. Bennett, 632 S.E.2d 281, 288 (S.C. 2006). The Fourth Circuit, in 
upholding the granting of Bennett’s habeas petition, correctly noted that 
“[t]he prosecutor easily could have highlighted Bennett’s physical attributes 
in a race-neutral manner.” Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 
2016) (including pointing out that the same prosecutor had done so in an 
earlier hearing and giving examples of how the prosecutor could have done 
so again). 
220. Bennett, 632 S.E.2d at 289. 
221. Id. at 288. 
222. Stirling, 842 F.3d at 324–25. 
223. Id. at 324. That court also noted the reference’s cross-racial implications, as 
King Kong swings “the frail, white, blonde Fay Wray at the top of the 
Empire State Building.” The court also quoted a journal article calling the 
movie “a racist cautionary tale about interracial romance.” Id. at 325 
(quoting the appellee’s brief, which quoted Phillip Atiba Goff, Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt, Matthew Christian Jackson & Melissa J. Williams, Not Yet 
Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary 
Consequences, 94 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 292, 293 (2008)). 
224. Id. at 319, 321. 
225. Alford, supra note 39, at 350 (describing Johnson v. Zandt, 295 S.E.2d 63, 
69 (Ga. 1982)). 
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Additionally, courts fail to acknowledge explicitly racial language 
by suggesting that jurors may attribute non-racial meanings to the 
words used. For example, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “it is not 
even certain . . . that the reference to the witness’s ‘shucking and 
jiving’ was racial in character” because although the “phrase is Negro 
dialect . . . numerous other words and phrases of that dialect . . . 
have become absorbed into standard English and are now applied to 
members of all racial and ethnic groups.”226 That court also concluded 
that calling the defendant “super-fly” was unmistakably racial because 
it was a reference to a movie series, but reasoned that because those 
movies were marketed to Black audiences, it was unclear whether the 
white jury would have understood the reference.227 
Courts sometimes deflect the racist overtones of prosecutorial 
rhetoric by focusing on the prosecutor’s intent. The Supreme Court, 
outside the context of racial arguments, said that courts “should not 
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its 
most damaging meaning.”228 The Seventh Circuit includes this idea in 
its formulation of the rule on racial arguments: “a racial remark is 
improper if it is ‘intentionally injected into volatile proceedings where 
the prosecutor had targeted the defendant’s ethnic origin for emphasis 
in an attempt to appeal to the jury’s prejudices.’”229 That court applied 
this rule to justify questions to several witnesses about the defendant’s 
“membership in the [B]lack Muslim faith” because these questions 
“were only meant to show” motive and were “clearly intended to rebut” 
the defendant’s proffered insanity defense.230 Similarly, an author ex–
tensively discusses an Oklahoma capital case in which the court justified 
the prosecutor’s introduction of an image of a black ape and, while 
showing the image to the jury, said “that’s [the defendant] in a 
nutshell.”231 The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection, and 
the court of appeals explicitly concluded that the prosecutor did not 
 
226. Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1995). 
227. Id. 
228. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974) (cautioning the courts 
against assuming that the jury will “draw [the most damaging] meaning 
from the plethora of less damaging interpretations”). 
229. See, e.g., Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
230. Id. at 830–31. The concurrence noted the problem with that reasoning: “to 
ascribe to a defendant a motive to kill simply because he is a Black Muslim 
and because other African-Americans, or other Muslims, have expressed 
distrust (or worse) of different races and religions, is to engage in wholly 
inappropriate stereotyping.” Id. at 832 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
231. Alford, supra note 39, at 342 (discussing Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 97 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994)) (emphasis omitted). 
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intend the statement to be interpreted as arguing that the defendant 
was an ape. 232  As explained above, however, whether a statement 
activates a stereotype has nothing to do with whether the person 
making the statement intended for it to do so. Courts should be focusing 
on the potential impact of the statement on the jury, not on the 
prosecutor’s intent.233 
Relatedly, courts sometimes avoid confronting the racist dimension 
of prosecutorial rhetoric by using more generic labels like “inflam–
matory” or “name-calling.”234 For example, in the Oklahoma capital 
case, only one court out of many levels of review even came close to 
acknowledging the racist dimension of the prosecutor’s use of the “black 
ape” image with the statement that the image was the defendant in a 
nutshell. 235  The Tenth Circuit labeled the image and language 
“improper name calling” without acknowledging the inherent racism; 
the court used that weaker label in an unpublished opinion denying the 
defendant’s habeas petition. 236  In another case, the United States 
Supreme Court failed to explicitly note the racial connotations of the 
prosecution’s reference to the defendant as an animal and statement 
that the defendant “shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on 
him and a prison guard at the other end of that leash.”237 
Finally, courts fail to clarify the appropriate line between proper 
and improper rhetoric by blurring the analytically distinct issues of 
whether the language was improper and whether the defendant was 
 
232. Id. Prosecutors in other cases discussed in the prior subsection argued that 
they did not intend their comments to be racist, although the courts rejected 
those arguments. See, e.g., State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 621 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 2002) (prosecutor argued that he didn’t intend to be racist and that 
he referred to defendants as Afro-American because he didn’t want to use 
the victim’s words of “black dude”). 
233. Prasad, supra note 49, at 3118 (noting that prosecutorial intent can 
sometimes be difficult to discern, and that if motives do matter, courts 
should consider more than explicit bias because “[t]he fact that some courts 
find subtle racial arguments plausible suggests that the jurors might find 
them persuasive”). 
234. Scholars often use the “inflammatory” or “name-calling” labels for racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 39, at 329–30, 364. Those 
categories, however, also include non-racial arguments, such as appeal to 
patriotism or class. See, e.g., Charles L. Cantrell, Prosecutorial Misconduct: 
Recognizing Errors in Closing Argument, 26 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 535, 
561–62 (2003). 
235. Alford, supra note 39, at 342–43 (discussing Allen, 871 P.2d at 97). 
236. Id. at 342. Ms. Allen was ultimately executed. Id. at 340. 
237. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 n.12 (1986). 
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prejudiced by the prosecutor’s rhetoric.238 For example, in a 2020 North 
Carolina case involving the prosecution of a white defendant for killing 
a young Black man, the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argued that race 
had been an undercurrent of the whole case and a focus of defense 
counsel’s closing.239 After the defense’s objection was overruled, the 
prosecutor said: “Let’s talk about the elephant in the room. If they 
want to go there, consider it.”240 The prosecutor then rhetorically asked 
if the victim and others with him “were a bunch of young, white males 
walking around wearing N.C. State hats, is he laying dead bleeding in 
that yard?”241 The North Carolina Supreme Court assumed without 
deciding that these remarks were improper, focusing instead on whether 
the argument was prejudicial; the court upheld the conviction because 
there was no reasonable probability that the defendant would have been 
acquitted if the trial court had sustained the objection.242 The concur–
rence wrote separately to explain that the prosecutor’s argument was 
proper because it was not based on racial animosity and because the 
case had involved a risk that jurors could be swayed by race, starting 
from jury selection onward. 243  The concurrence was right in this 
analysis, but the majority’s approach in assuming that the comments 
were improper may make future prosecutors afraid to address the racial 
motive for a hate crime.244 
C. Appellate Procedural Doctrines Prevent Meaningful Remedies 
Even when courts label racist prosecutorial rhetoric as improper, 
they often fail to provide any meaningful remedy because of the appel–
late doctrines of harmless error and plain error.245 The combined effect 
 
238. The courts often do so when analyzing plain error in the absence of an 
objection. See infra Section II(C). But they sometimes do so even when the 
defendant objects. See State v. Copley, 839 S.E.2d 726, 728 (N.C. 2020). 
239. Copley, 839 S.E.2d at 728. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 731. 
243. Id. at 732. 
244. For a discussion of the specific challenges of prosecuting white defendants 
for committing crimes against people of color, see infra note 307. 
245. See, e.g., V.A. Richelle, Racism as a Strategic Tool at Trial: Appealing Race-
Based Prosecutorial Misconduct, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2357, 2358 (1993) 
(“However, procedural and substantive doctrines such as harmless-error 
analysis and limited standards of review may tie the hands of appellate 
courts. The courts’ limited ability to review actions of the trial court and the 
small number of remedies available to them may preclude the reversal of 
verdicts colored by racial prejudice.”). 
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of these doctrines means that “prosecutors know they are likely to get 
away with this form of misbehavior.”246 
The harmless-error doctrine allows an appellate court to uphold a 
conviction even after finding that the prosecutor’s conduct was 
improper when the appellate court concludes that the case against the 
defendant was so strong that the improper conduct likely did not 
change the outcome.247 Several scholars have critiqued courts’ harmless 
error analysis as overestimating the strength of the government’s case 
or relying too much on simply counting the number of improper 
references.248 This approach is inconsistent with the research described 
above about how racial stereotyping can taint both memories and 
evaluation of evidence of guilt.249 
Scholars have also noted the perverse incentives created by 
harmless error analysis, which encourages prosecutors to “weigh the 
commission of evidentiary or procedural violations not against a legal 
or ethical standard of appropriate conduct, but rather, against an 
increasingly accurate prediction that the appellate courts will ignore 
the misconduct when sufficient evidence exists to prove the defendant’s 
guilt.”250 Yet when cases are close, prosecutors still have an incentive to 
 
246. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 893, 922.  
247. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 16, at 315. In some circumstances, defense 
counsel must prove that the error affected the outcome, while in other 
circumstances, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error was harmless. See, e.g., Richelle, supra note 245, at 2369–70. Some 
have argued that neither of those standards is adequate, and instead that 
courts should treat race-based prosecutorial misconduct as a structural error 
that requires immediate reversal without consideration of whether the 
misconduct was harmless. See, e.g., id. at 2368. 
248. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 15, at 327 (noting that courts often count the 
references without engaging in deeper analysis of their effect); Demetria D. 
Frank, The Proof is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, Uncharged Act 
Evidence & the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 Harv. J. Racial & Ethnic 
Just. 1, 24–25 nn.139, 142 (2016) (noting that courts often rely on the 
weight of the evidence against the defendant); Bowman, supra note 16, at 
347–52 (discussing several problems with courts’ harmless error analysis in 
cases of improper prosecutorial rhetoric without focusing specifically on 
racist prosecutorial rhetoric—but much of the same logic applies in this 
specific context). 
249. See supra Part I(B). It also arguably shifts the burden of fairness to the 
defendant. Earle, supra note 34, at 1229. 
250. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 425 
(1992); see also Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of 
the American Prosecutor 127 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (“[The harmless 
error rule] permits, perhaps even unintentionally encourages, prosecutors to 
engage in misconduct during trial with the assurance that so long as the 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt is clear, the conviction will be affirmed.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial 
78 
use improper rhetoric to tip the scales.251 Thus, the harmless-error 
doctrine fails to provide any disincentive to avoid racist prosecutorial 
rhetoric.252 
When appellate courts label conduct as improper but refuse to 
impose any meaningful remedy, the appellate courts’ warnings about 
impropriety are easily seen as empty threats.253 For example, one author 
discusses a Florida case in which defense counsel on appeal noted that 
seven previous cases warned prosecutors that the same argument was 
prosecutorial misconduct; in the eighth case, the appellate court merely 
declared that appellate courts would be forced to start ordering 
reversals if this line of improper argument continued in future cases.254 
He also discussed a similar California case in which the appellate court 
threatened that future reversals might be necessary but still affirmed a 
conviction even though the court found it “disheartening” that the 
prosecutor “took pride in” previous admonitions about improper 
conduct.255 These empty threats of future reversals without present 
consequences functionally tell prosecutors that they can continue doing 
what they have been doing. When courts routinely hold that conduct 
is improper but harmless, that “creates a culture in which 
. . . defendants are virtually guaranteed to have their constitutional 
rights violated.”256 
The situation is even worse when defense counsel fails to object and 
appellate courts invoke the plain-error doctrine. Although appellate 
courts generally refuse to review issues that were not presented to the 
 
251. Alford, supra note 39, at 334 (analogizing closing arguments to a basketball 
game in the final minute; the closer the score, the more the prosecution has 
an incentive to use racist prosecutorial rhetoric). 
252. See Bowman, supra note 16, at 316–17 (arguing that beyond the incentives 
created, courts’ current approaches to these issues may exacerbate prosecutors’ 
own cognitive biases). 
253. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 893–94. 
254. Id. at 893 (discussing Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 521–22 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1984)). 
255. Id. at 894 (discussing People v. Congious, No. B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Dec. 4, 1987)). Although these cases involved other types of prosecutorial 
misconduct in argument, rather than racist prosecutorial rhetoric, the same 
“empty threat” dynamic is at play when courts refuse to reverse. 
256. State v. Jackson, No. 97681-3, 2020 WL 4006802, at *7 (Wash. July 16, 
2020). The state had conceded at oral argument that trial courts were 
refusing to hold individualized hearings required by precedent, which led 
to the Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning quoted above about a 
system in which defendants were virtually guaranteed to have their rights 
violated. Id. Although Jackson involved mandatory shackling rather than 
racist prosecutorial rhetoric, the court’s reasoning applies in this context 
as well, particularly if trial courts are overruling objections or otherwise 
justifying racist prosecutorial rhetoric. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial 
79 
trial court through formal objections, the plain-error doctrine allows for 
that review when failure to do so would undermine the trial’s 
fundamental fairness.257 Courts often use this doctrine to review claims 
of racist prosecutorial rhetoric. 258  However, this standard is nearly 
impossible to meet, as it often requires a defendant to prove both that 
the remarks were so improper as to have denied him a fair trial and 
that the result of the trial would have been different without the 
remarks.259 
The plain-error doctrine therefore inappropriately puts the burden 
on defense counsel to object rather than on the prosecutor to avoid 
racist rhetoric.260 Yet defense counsel may have valid reasons for not 
objecting, such as being afraid that they, rather than the prosecutor, 
may be seen as the one “playing the ‘race card.’”261 The phrase “playing 
the race card” is pejorative, suggesting “a dirty trick” to “exploit our 
sympathies to racial injustice in order to secure some political or 
material advantage.” 262  Defense counsel therefore rightly fear jury 
backlash if the trial court overrules the objection.263 
Furthermore, if well-intentioned prosecutors may not recognize the 
racist dimension of their rhetoric, defense counsel may be even less 
 
257. Richelle, supra note 245, at 2359 (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 
1, 16 (1985)). 
258. Id. at 2359–60. 
259. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 922 (citing United States v. Anderson, 303 
F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Richelle, supra note 245, at 2361–
62 (discussing various standards and approaches that courts use in plain 
error review). 
260. See Montz, supra note 140, at 76, 78 (discussing the “plain error” doctrine 
and how it significantly limits appellate review of prosecutorial misconduct 
when defense counsel fails to object). 
261. See, e.g., Prasad, supra note 49, at 3112. This concern by defense counsel is 
bolstered by case law in which prosecutors attack defense counsel for playing 
the race card. See, e.g., State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2005) 
(alleging that defense counsel was “just throwing mud on young black men” 
and then arguing that references to gang membership involved “wild and, I 
submit, racist speculation on the part of counsel here”); United States v. 
Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (addressing argument by 
Black prosecutor that defense’s theory that Defendant had been mis-identified 
as the one to commit a robbery was based on defense counsel arguing that 
“we all look alike” without ever addressing the substance of the mis-
identification risk in the case). 
262. Christopher A. Bracey, The Color of Our Future: The Pitfalls and Possibilities 
of the Race Card in American Culture, 5 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 93–94 
(2009). 
263. Alford, supra note 39, at 337. 
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likely to pick up on the problem with that rhetoric.264 But “subtle” 
references to stereotypes may be even more dangerous than explicit 
racist appeals given that they may activate biases without jurors 
recognizing what is happening and guarding against them.265 And even 
when defense counsel recognize the problem, “the misconduct typically 
happens too quickly to mount a thoughtful and effective response.”266 
Additionally, the plain-error doctrine sometimes leads to a lack of 
clarity about whether prosecutorial remarks are improper. 267  That 
approach makes it harder for prosecutors’ offices to use appellate 
opinions in training prosecutors about the boundaries between proper 
and improper arguments. 268  Appellate courts’ opinions can serve a 
pedagogic function, but only when they draw reasonably clear lines 
between proper and improper conduct.269 
While these doctrines do not always stand in the way of reversal,270 
courts often affirm convictions even in the face of fairly egregious 
misconduct. 271  For example, the Colorado Supreme Court recently 
relied on the plain-error doctrine in upholding the sexual assault 
conviction of a defendant whose trial involved the prosecutor making 
 
264. Prasad, supra note 49, at 3112 (noting that even if the plain-error doctrine 
makes sense for explicitly racist appeals, it prevents defense counsel and trial 
courts from providing meaningful intervention for arguments based on implicit 
biases). 
265. Armour, supra note 68, at 767. 
266. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 893. 
267. See supra Part II(C). 
268. See Bruce A. Green, Regulating Prosecutors’ Courtroom Misconduct, 50 Loy. 
U. Chi. L.J. 797, 808–09 (2019). 
269. See id. at 808.  
270. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1503 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding 
reversible error because “[w]e believe that by twice calling the African-
American Defendants ‘bad people’ and by calling attention to the fact that 
[they] were not locals, the prosecutor gave the jury an improper and convenient 
hook on which to hang their verdict”). In an unusual case, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction even though it concluded that “it would 
be difficult for us not to conclude that the prosecutor’s comments were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 475 
(Minn. 2005). The court concluded that although there was strong evidence of 
the defendant’s guilt, reversal was required when the prosecutor’s argument 
and the trial court’s overruling of defense’s objection “may have led the jury 
to conclude that defense counsel himself was racist—an implication wholly 
unsupported by the record.” Id. at 474–75. 
271. For example, in Darden v. Wainright, the prosecutor said that the defendant 
was an animal and should not be out of a cell without a leash. The Court 
concluded that the comments did not “so [infect] the trial with unfairness” 
as to require reversal. 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). 
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explicit and repeated references to the race and skin tone of the 
defendant and victim. 272  The court of appeals had reversed the 
conviction, reasoning among other things that “errors involving racial 
discrimination must be treated with added precaution” and that 
“comments that appeal to racial prejudice fundamentally undermine 
the principle of equal justice and therefore demand that an appellate 
court set appropriate standards to deter such conduct.”273 The court 
agreed that the comments were improper, rejecting several arguments 
by the government justifying the prosecutor’s remarks.274 However, the 
court ultimately affirmed the conviction based on the plain-error 
doctrine, reasoning that “we cannot say that the error so undermined 
the fundamental fairness of [the defendant’s] trial so as to cast serious 
doubt on the reliability of his judgment of conviction.”275 
In another case, the court relied on the plain-error doctrine in 
upholding a conviction even when the prosecutor’s opening statement 
contained sixteen references to “black males,” “larger black male[s],” 
and “smaller black male[s].”276 The court’s reasoning seemed to blur the 
question of whether the comments were improper and whether they 
were prejudicial. 277  The court stated that it did “not condone the 
gratuitous use of race, as the prosecutors did in this case,” but the court 
also emphasized that the remarks “were descriptive, not pejorative.”278 
 
272. People v. Robinson, 454 P.3d 229, 231 (Colo. 2019) (“You’re going to hear 
that [A.M.] is white. And she’s actually pretty pasty. She’s pasty white. And 
you obviously have seen Mr. Robinson is dark. He is an African American of 
dark complexion. [E.G.] looks over and she can see a dark penis going into a 
white body. That’s how graphic she could see [sic].”). 
273. Id. at 232. 
274. Id. at 234. 
275. Id. at 235. The court relied on the general instruction the trial court gave 
advising jurors to not “allow bias or prejudice . . . to influence their 
decisions,” as well as the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant on some 
counts. Id. The court’s analysis of the comments’ impropriety suggested 
confusion over why the prosecutor would have thought the comments were 
relevant and how to balance the probative value against prejudicial effect. 
See id. at 234. If the Colorado Supreme Court had some difficulty with that 
analysis given ample time for reflection, that suggests it is unreasonable to 
expect defense counsel to do this calculation effectively in deciding whether 
to object in the moment. 
276. State v. Mitchell, 783 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). 
277. Id. at 1254–55.  
278. Id. The court did not discuss why sixteen separate mentions of “black” was 
necessary or useful for identification, or why the prosecutor could not have 
just talked about the larger and smaller male without reference to race, at 
least after the first time. The court also noted that the comments were only 
made in opening statements, which the prosecutor structured as a “mystery” 
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While some descriptive reference to race is proper, the court failed to 
analyze the repetitive nature of the sixteen separate references.279 The 
court also emphasized that the “alleged misconduct was not central to 
any critical issue in the case,”280 which is commonly part of harmless-
error analysis. The court also relied on the strength of the state’s case 
and ultimately concluded that the defendant was not deprived of a fair 
trial.281 The dissent, by contrast, noted that racial arguments need to 
be more carefully scrutinized, and stated that “I cannot conceive of any 
valid reason for those racial references.”282 
These decisions, and many more like them, show the courts’ naïveté 
about the severity and impact of racist prosecutorial rhetoric. Even if 
these decisions can be justified in individual cases, collectively they 
create a system that tolerates and even encourages prosecutors to use 
racist prosecutorial rhetoric. The next section lays a foundation for 
potential solutions to this current state of structural racism. 
III. Focus on Trial Courts for Solutions             
About Controlling Biases 
The clear theme of the research described above in Part I(B) is that 
decision-making improves when actors are aware of the ways in which 
race affects decision-making. Therefore, this section focuses on race-
conscious rather than colorblind solutions283 to the problem of racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric. These solutions relate to court actions, as “courts 
provide the primary restraint on prosecutorial misconduct” at trial.284 
 
about what happened, and that in closing arguments the prosecutor referred 
to them by name rather than description. See id. 
279. For the importance of repetition, see supra notes 165–169 and accompanying 
text. 
280. Mitchell, 783 A.2d at 1254. Although the court said that, the court also 
noted elsewhere in the opinion that the victims could not positively identify 
the defendant, so identification did seem to be a critical issue. See id. at 
1253. 
281. Id. at 1255. 
282. Id. at 1259 (Spear, J., dissenting). The dissent also used a race-switching 
argument that if the robbery victims had been Black and the defendants 
were white, the prosecutor would not have made sixteen references to the 
perpetrators being white. Id. 
283. See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Normalizing Domination, 20 CUNY L. Rev. 493, 
504 (2017) (“[T]here ought to be a reinvigoration of what race consciousness 
means, even if that meaning forces us to stand contrary to the majoritarian 
view that we live in a post-racial society.”). 
284. Lyon, supra note 15, at 335–36; see also Alford, supra note 39, at 333 (“If 
it is likely that White jurors possess negative stereotypes about Black 
defendants, this creates a clear incentive for prosecutors to cater to jurors’ 
prejudices with racist argumentation, either overt or subtle. Given these 
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Section A below argues that trial courts rather than appellate courts 
are best positioned to provide that restraint. Section B argues why trial 
courts should focus on prosecutors rather than treating prosecutors and 
defense counsel equally. Section C summarizes the social science 
research about controlling bias, also called debiasing strategies, which 
provides the foundation for the specific strategies discussed below in 
Part IV. 
A. Trial Courts are Better Positioned than                          
Appellate Courts to Spur Change 
While changes to appellate review285  and professional discipline 
rules286 may also be useful in confronting racist prosecutorial rhetoric, 
trial courts are in the best position to make an immediate and lasting 
impact.287 
First, trial courts are better positioned than appellate courts to 
evaluate the context of challenged prosecutorial rhetoric and to see 
 
incentives, it is the courts’ willingness to address covert racism that is 
crucial to the creation of an effective deterrent.”); Green, supra note 268, 
at 812–13 (discussing the organizational reasons why prosecutors’ offices 
tend to support rather than serve to check prosecutorial misconduct); 
Randall Grometstein & Jennifer M. Balboni, Backing out of a Constitutional 
Ditch: Constitutional Remedies for Gross Prosecutorial Misconduct Post 
Thompson, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 1243, 1281 (2011) (noting that the courts 
providing a check on prosecutorial behavior is part of the constitutional 
system of checks and balances between the three branches of government). 
285. Appellate court analysis needs to be reshaped as well to deal with the 
problems identified above. This article is the first of three dealing with 
the various facets of racist prosecutorial misconduct. A future article will 
discuss changes to harmless error and plain error analysis in these cases. 
286. Professional discipline has generally not been a common or effective method 
of checking prosecutorial behavior. See Grometstein & Balboni, supra note 
284, at 1269 (discussing a study by the Center for Public Integrity of 11,000 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and noting that only thirty-four of 
them led to professional discipline hearings). Some scholars have nevertheless 
focused on use of the professional discipline system enforcing the ethics rules 
as the best route to deal with prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Chris 
Cialeo, [In]equality Under the Law: Remedying Unequal Antidiscrimination 
Ethics Rules for Federal Prosecutors, 28 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 435, 437–
39 (2015); Green, supra note 268, at 810–14. A brief review of that 
scholarship indicates that current ethics rules need to be strengthened, which 
is something I also plan to explore in another follow-up article. 
287. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and 
Trial Judges, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 629, 675–76 (1972) (arguing for trial courts 
to take a more active role in dealing with prosecutorial misconduct and 
noting that “[i]t is perhaps unfortunate that the legal profession has come to 
look to the appellate courts as the principal or almost exclusive source of 
innovation in criminal procedure”). 
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juror reactions.288 The “cold record” of an appellate transcript often fails 
to include details, such as the prosecutor’s tone of voice or facial 
expressions, that trial judges can observe and evaluate.289 While the 
court reporter in one case noted that the prosecutor repeatedly said 
“po-leese” rather than “police,”290 that kind of detail in the transcript 
seems to be relatively rare and could easily have been invisible on 
appeal or only made visible only through defense counsel’s argument. 
Trial courts are also best positioned to confront prosecutors about 
their use of stereotypes. Research supports the idea that explicitly 
confronting individuals with their reliance on stereotypes can effectively 
decrease their reliance on those stereotypes, at least temporarily.291 
Researchers found that when study participants were made aware of 
the role of stereotype in their responses, “participant responses display–
ed significantly fewer stereotypes (compared to responses given before 
the confrontation).”292 Appellate court review does not provide this kind 
of immediate confrontation, while trial judges can take a variety of 
immediate actions during trial to provide this confrontation, as 
explained below. 
Additionally, trial courts possess broad powers to take action.293 
While sources of trial court authority may vary by jurisdiction, judges 
can generally rely on statutory authority, codes of ethics, and court 
rules when controlling attorney courtroom behavior.294 Additionally, 
“[t]he doctrine of inherent judicial power permits the judicial branch to 
take necessary actions to fulfill its constitutional functions, even when 
those actions are not expressly authorized by constitution or statute.”295 
This inherent power allows courts to control the conduct of judicial 
proceedings.296 In exercising these various powers, judges have broad 
 
288. Earle, supra note 34, at 1229. 
289. Lyon, supra note 15, at 327. 
290. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 553–54 (Wash. 2011). 
291. Levinson, supra note 94, at 413. 
292. Id. at 413–14. 
293. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the 
Adversary System: The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 
2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 945, 972 (2008). 
294. Ty Tasker, Sticks and Stones: Judicial Handling of Invective in Advocacy, 
42 Judges’ J. 17, 18 (2003). 
295. Backus, supra note 293, at 972. 
296. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (“[W]e must remember that 
reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that 
will prevent the prejudice at its inception.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial 
85 
discretion, 297  including the power to impose contempt sanctions. 298 
Contempt sanctions can be imposed against prosecutors as well as 
against defense counsel, although courts generally impose these sanc–
tions much more frequently against defense counsel.299 Trial courts may 
even have an ethical obligation to act: “The trial judge has the respon–
sibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the interests 
of the public in the administration of criminal justice.”300 As explained 
above, racist prosecutorial rhetoric implicates both the rights of 
individual defendants and the broader public interest in the fair and 
impartial administration of justice. These various sources of authority 
support actions by individual trial judges, and judges can also “suggest, 
and express support of, new legislation, rulemaking, and ethics 
guidelines where needed.”301 
On the other hand, when trial courts fail to confront racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric, that failure encourages it to continue and even 
to worsen.302 Several commentators have raised concerns about “ethical 
 
297. Backus, supra note 293, at 972. In fact, these powers are generally so broad 
that valid concerns have been raised about the potential for “idiosyncratic” 
and “erratic rules.” Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional 
Limitations on the Judicial Contempt Power Part One: The Conflict Between 
Advocacy and Contempt, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 477, 483 (1990). My point here 
is not to delineate the outer limits of these powers, but to demonstrate that 
trial courts have ample authority to take meaningful action to deal with racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric. 
298. D. Alana Leaphart, Authority of the Trial Judge, 77 Geo. L.J. 1009, 1023 
(1989). 
299. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 287, at 673–74; see also Raveson, supra note 
297, at 582–83 (noting that defense counsel are cited for contempt far more 
than prosecutors, and discussing various factors that may account for this 
disparity, which does not seem to reflect more misconduct by defense counsel 
than prosecutors). 
300. Backus, supra note 293, at 962 (quoting Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice Special Functions of the Trial Judge 6-1.1 
(3d ed. 2000)). While the ABA Standards are not mandatory in any 
jurisdiction, courts nevertheless “giv[e] them considerable weight.” Id. at 
n.83. 
301. Tasker, supra note 294, at 21. As discussed in Part IV, some specific steps 
should be taken by individual trial judges, but many of the solutions would 
benefit from rulemaking in the form of court rules or model jury instructions. 
302. Green, supra note 268, at 812 (arguing that courts should not ignore 
“minor, but visible, prosecutorial infractions” because “[c]ontemporary 
social science teachings offer reasons to worry that this strategy fosters 
not only recurring low-level misconduct but more serious wrongdoing.”); 
see also Tasker, supra note 294, at 21 (quoting People v. Travis, 276 P.2d 
193, 199 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954)) (noting that courts should express 
“disapproval rather than . . . tacit approval” to minimize incentives for 
attorneys to engage in inappropriate behavior). 
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slippage” or “slippery slope” regarding courts failing to discipline 
prosecutors.303 When prosecutors get away with “overreaching in little 
visible ways,” they may become more willing to commit more serious 
misconduct.304 Again, trial courts are better positioned than appellate 
courts to provide the kind of corrective interventions needed, and 
research shows that their failure to do so may have significant conse–
quences for the overall pattern of prosecutorial behavior, regardless of 
what appellate courts decide later.305 
B. Trial Courts Should Focus on Prosecutors 
The solutions described below focus on prosecutors; they should not 
be applied as written to defense counsel.306 While defense counsel might 
certainly use racist rhetoric, several reasons support treating prose–
cutors differently.307 
 
303. See, e.g., Green, supra note 268, at 813 (discussing “ethical slippage”); Earle, 
supra note 34, at 1214 (noting that courts allowing racism to go unaddressed 
perpetuates injustice and “erodes the safeguard of a fair trial”). 
304. Green, supra note 268, at 813. In those situations, the failure of courts and 
other entities to provide any check for misconduct may blind them to the fact 
that their behavior is inappropriate. See infra note 409 and accompanying 
text. 
305. Green, supra note 268, at 810, 812. 
306. Application of these concepts to civil cases is beyond the scope of this article. 
307. In focusing on prosecutors, I do not want to minimize the dangers from 
defense counsel using racist rhetoric, particularly when representing white 
defendants being prosecuted for crimes against Black victims, and some 
scholars have used that lens to argue for rules about racial references in 
criminal trials that would apply to both prosecutors and defense counsel. 
See, e.g., Jonathan Markovitz, “A Spectacle of Slavery Unwilling to Die”: 
Curbing Reliance on Racial Stereotyping in Self-Defense Cases, 5 UC Irvine 
L. Rev. 873, 931 (2015) (“Several scholars have suggested prohibiting any 
discussion of race at trial, or developing ‘race shield’ laws, modeled after rape 
shield laws, that would prohibit reliance on racial imagery, with several 
exceptions.”). I certainly do not intend for this article to make it harder to 
prosecute cases of racial violence against victims of color, and I have tried to 
craft solutions below that allow prosecutors to demonstrate to courts the 
need for racially conscious language and theories. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra 
note 3, at 2242 (“Race-conscious, community-oriented duties to investigate 
and prosecute cases of racially motivated violence correspond with the public 
purposes of criminal justice.”). But even in these cases, prosecutors should 
avoid narratives that reinforce “hierarchies of white dominance and black 
subordination.” Id. at 2243. In other words, prosecutors should be careful to 
avoid racist rhetoric, even when they might think they are using that rhetoric 
for a just cause. Instead, I argue that prosecutors should avoid in all cases 
rhetoric that would be racist when used against a Black defendant, even if 
that rhetoric is arguably non-racist in a particular case. See infra note 409. 
Finally, although the role of defense counsel in countering racist prosecutorial 
rhetoric is beyond the scope of this article, others have produced good 
scholarship on this topic. See generally, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 69. And I 
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As Professor Anna Roberts points out, “an examination of some of 
the core structures of the criminal justice system reveals that 
asymmetry is a central component of the system’s design and of its 
attempts to achieve fairness.”308 The Constitution provides criminal 
defendants with several rights that are not provided to the prosecution, 
such as the right to confront adverse witnesses and the right not to be 
compelled to self-incriminate.309 Courts interpreting these rights have 
reinforced asymmetry, for example in placing the burden on the 
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a criminal convic–
tion.310 
Additionally, prosecutors and defense counsel play different roles 
within the system. As noted above, prosecutors have an ethical duty to 
“seek justice” rather than to win convictions at any cost, while defense 
counsel must represent their clients and seek acquittals or other client-
centered responses without an eye towards broader issues of justice.311 
Prosecutors are also representatives of the government, and 
government representatives have a particularly important role to both 
literally enforce anti-discrimination laws and act within the spirit of 
those laws when performing other tasks.312 In using racist rhetoric, “a 
prosecutor would, at the very least, be acting contrary to the spirit 
of . . . antidiscrimination laws as a means of enforcing other laws.”313 
And when judges fail to impose consequences on prosecutors for using 
racist rhetoric, that failure “effectively results in two branches of 
government sanctioning such discriminatory conduct.”314 
Jurors’ views of prosecutors and defense counsel also matter. Jurors 
and other members of the public generally do not understand why 
 
agree with the Critical Race Theory scholarship that emphasizes the import–
ance of ensuring that defense counsel can tell their client’ stories when 
representing people of color. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 42, 
at 43–56 (discussing legal storytelling and narrative analysis within Critical 
Race Theory, including how these techniques help reveal “ignored or 
alternative realities” and how counter-storytelling helps provide a “cure for 
silencing”). So while it may be appropriate to limit the rhetoric available to 
defense counsel, at least in some circumstances, the nuances of that issue are 
beyond the scope of this article, and courts can and should focus at this point 
on prosecutorial rhetoric. 
308. Roberts, supra note 45, at 1539. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 1540. 
312. See Cialeo, supra note 286, at 441. 
313. Id. 
314. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 54, at 333–34 (noting the danger in the 
government validating “the basic premise of Plessy—that people of color can 
be permissibly othered and degraded”). 
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defense counsel must extend their zealous advocacy even to guilty 
clients.315 Research also shows that jurors’ explicit and implicit biases 
both favor the prosecution.316 “Because of her unique position, juries 
invest the prosecutor with authority beyond that of an advocate, and 
the prosecutor must be accountable for that authority.” 317  The 
combination of these factors suggest that racist prosecutorial rhetoric 
poses asymmetrical danger to the integrity of the fairness of the 
criminal justice system, and they support the idea that asymmetrical 
treatment of prosecutors better ensures the goal of fairness. 
C. Overview of Debiasing Strategies from Social Science Research 
While the research described above presents a somewhat daunting 
picture of how many different ways race can affect decision-making in 
the criminal justice system, that research also provides a much more 
hopeful picture regarding several effective debiasing strategies.318 This 
section summarizes five strategies that collectively provide the founda–
tion for the specific solutions discussed in Part IV. These strategies are 
(1) considering the effect of biases and stereotypes on decision-making; 
(2) making race salient in a way that empowers controlling the effect 
of biases; (3) priming egalitarianism; (4) reducing cognitive load; and 
(5) making space for counter-narratives. 
An important first step is recognizing the existence of implicit bias, 
dispelling the illusion that our decision-making is color-blind.319 For 
example, studies show that simply raising awareness of potential 
implicit bias in decision-making was shown to lead to enrolling a more 
diverse medical school class and a reduction in basketball referees 
calling fouls in a racially disparate way, without any changes to the 
processes used in making these decisions.320 This increased awareness 
 
315. Roberts, supra note 45, at 1549. 
316. Id. at 1529 (“The explicit biases include widespread assumptions that police 
and prosecutors are unimpeachable, that the guilt of the accused is likely, 
and that the presumption of innocence is a fiction.”) (footnotes omitted). 
Roberts also notes that jurors’ implicit biases “tend to disfavor people of 
color, and thus a disproportionate number of criminal defendants. These 
implicit biases can affect all of the main tasks that jurors are called upon 
to perform: evaluation of evidence, evaluation of behavior, recall of facts, 
and judgment of guilt.” Id. at 1529–30 (footnotes omitted). 
317. Lyon, supra note 15, at 335. 
318. “[S]tudies consistently show that implicit bias can be controlled and 
regulated, and that its operation is not inevitable.” Selmi, supra note 26, 
at 232. This research does not mean that prejudice has an easy fix, but it 
does suggest that people with egalitarian values can control the effect of 
stereotypes on their decisions. See id. 
319. Lee, supra note 33, at 866. 
320. Selmi, supra note 26, at 231. 
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helps people exercise more care in decision-making, particularly for 
those who are internally motivated to self-correct.321 
That insight relates to the second key strategy—making race salient 
in a way that empowers individuals to control biases. Race salience 
means making decision-makers “aware of racial issues that can bias 
their decision-making, like the operation of racial stereotypes.”322 This 
increased awareness through race salience encourages decision-makers 
with egalitarian values “to consciously suppress stereotype-congruent 
responses that would otherwise be automatic.”323 Race salience can also 
help reduce bias in high-prejudice individuals who may try to appear 
egalitarian, in compliance with broader societal norms toward egali–
tarianism. 324  For both egalitarian and high-prejudiced individuals, 
making race salient provides motivation for them to avoid allowing 
stereotypes to affect their judgments.325 
Several studies demonstrate that making race salient can even the 
scales for Black and white defendants, while failure to do so leads to 
disparate treatment.326 For example, one study showed that white mock 
jurors were more likely to convict Black defendants than white defen–
dants and to recommend longer sentences when race was not 
mentioned, but when race was explicitly mentioned, that disparity 
disappeared.327 Another study found that white jurors were more likely 
to perceive white defendants as more honest and moral, and Black 
defendants as more violent, when race was not salient.328 
 
321. Richardson, supra note 22, at 887–88; see also Selmi, supra note 26, at 
230 (“Increasing awareness is likely to have the strongest effect on those 
who are receptive to the notion that implicit bias is a real issue, and that 
discrimination remains a pervasive societal force.”). 
322. Lee, supra note 23, at 1586. 
323. Id.; see also Selmi, supra note 26, at 230 (noting that those most likely to 
be able to control biases are those who have egalitarian ideals but are 
likely to underreport their own explicit biases). 
324. Lee, supra note 23, at 1608; see also Selmi, supra note 26, at 229–30 
(discussing studies showing “that people are likely to act in a less biased 
fashion when they know their actions are subject to review or judgment”; 
these studies included one on the effect of televising baseball games to a 
national audience on umpires’ strike zones and bias and another on biased 
cardiac care to Black patients). 
325. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1258. 
326. Lee, supra note 23, at 1588–89 (“Making race salient does not give the Black 
defendant an advantage over the similarly situated White defendant. 
Failing to make race salient, however, seems to lead to unequal treatment 
of similarly situated defendants, with the Black defendant receiving the 
short end of the stick.”). 
327. See Thompson, supra note 63, at 1295. 
328. Id. at 1295–96. 
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Race can be made salient in a criminal trial in a variety of ways, 
but simply having a victim and defendant of different races is not 
enough.329 Similarly, race is not made salient just by making decision-
makers aware of the race of the defendant or victim.330 Instead, research 
shows that jurors are better at guarding against the influence of 
prejudice in cases involving allegations of discrimination or that are 
otherwise more obviously racially charged. 331  For example, one 
experiment involved a fight between two teammates on a high school 
basketball team.332 In both scenarios, one player was Black and the 
other was white; the only difference between the two scenarios was the 
addition of a single sentence that the defendant had been subjected to 
racial remarks and unfair criticisms of teammates in the other racial 
group earlier in the season.333 In the version of the scenario without that 
sentence, mock jurors voted to convict the Black defendant 90% of the 
time and the white defendant only 70% of the time.334 In the scenario 
with the one additional sentence making race salient, however, both 
defendants were convicted at the same rate.335 
Several scholars have argued that courts should make race salient 
by raising the issue of bias or stereotyping in “routine” cases involving 
defendants of color that do not involve facts that more obviously make 
race relevant. For example, Professor Cynthia Lee argues that defense 
counsel should use voir dire to question jurors about potential racial 
bias336 and should use opening statements to educate jurors on the 
potential role of bias in decision-making and frame the story in a way 
that makes the jury more able to see the relevance of race.337 Other 
authors stress the role of jury instructions in making jurors aware of 
 
329. Lee, supra note 23, at 1563. 
330. Id. at 1586. 
331. See Hunt, supra note 18, at 275 (citing studies). “In other words, the very 
notion of ‘playing the race card’ is misleading. By virtue of . . . automatic 
and connectionist processes . . . ‘race cards’ are always present and having 
an effect, even when they are face down or still in the deck.” Blasi, supra 
note 28, at 1274. 
332. Id. at 1247. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
335. Id. See infra Section IV(A) regarding using voir dire and jury instructions 
to effectively make race salient. 
336. Lee, supra note 23, at 1590–91; see also Hunt, supra note 18, at 283 
(suggesting that jurors could be asked to reflect on their own racial biases 
during voir dire). 
337. Lee, supra note 23, at 1593–94; see also Lee, supra note 33, at 862–63. 
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the potential impact of implicit bias on decision-making and urging 
jurors to guard against relying on stereotypes in decision-making.338 
In raising the idea of biased decision-making, however, approach 
matters. As noted above, the term “implicit bias” is more effective than 
“unconscious racism” in suggesting that these biases are controllable.339 
Furthermore, terms like “unconscious racism” or “aversive racism” 
suggest individual immorality. 340  Strategies that come across as 
moralizing are more likely to be counter-productive rather than helpful, 
as “the seemingly universal drive to maintain our self-image plays a role 
in generating stereotypes and prejudice.” 341  On the other hand, 
“deviation from rational decisionmaking is not simply a cognitive glitch, 
but a meaningful cultural statement that reflects the way people 
unknowingly carry society’s weaknesses with them at all times.”342 So 
the framing of these issues for jurors should generally include reference 
back to the underlying research into biased decision-making343  and 
should emphasize the ability to counteract implicit biases and stereo–
types through a focus on non-prejudiced beliefs.344 
That leads to the third debiasing strategy, priming for egalitarian 
beliefs. Race consciousness is not by itself enough to undo structural 
racism, as “[o]ne may have a subordinationist race consciousness or an 
 
338. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias 
in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed 
Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 149, 
169 (2010); Thompson, supra note 63, at 1301–06. 
339. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
340. Blasi, supra note 28, at 1276. While this insight is arguably inconsistent with 
my use of “racist” throughout this article, the term here refers to the rhetoric 
rather than the person using it. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
Additionally, this article is intended to appeal to people (particularly 
prosecutors and judges) with egalitarian values and low prejudice, to help 
them change their approaches to this issue by giving them a broader 
framework for understanding the racism inherent in certain rhetorical 
choices. See also Blasi, supra note 28, at 1281 (noting that another scholar’s 
explanation of “institutional racism” is helpful because “despite the emotive 
implications of the term, it is at bottom an account of how very ordinary 
and unremarkable are the methods by which we maintain structures of 
inequality. . . . [T]his account . . . [is] less likely to encounter the 
resistance generated by more moralizing and accusatory stances.”). Thus, 
the term “racist prosecutorial rhetoric” should be seen as conveying urgency 
rather than moral judgment. 
341. Id. at 1271. 
342. Levinson, supra note 94, at 420. 
343. Blasi, supra note 28, at 1276. 
344. See Armour, supra note 68, at 744 (discussing “the possibility of inhibiting 
and replacing stereotype-congruent responses with nonprejudiced responses 
derived from nonprejudiced personal beliefs”). 
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egalitarian race consciousness.”345 Making race salient is important, but 
it should be done in a way that furthers an egalitarian approach to race 
consciousness. While racist rhetoric can activate stereotypes and prime 
for prejudice, antidiscrimination norms can also be primed and 
activated.346 For example, jurors can be instructed that they should not 
allow their verdicts to be influenced by bias or prejudice. A recent study 
concluded that an instruction with language about avoiding bias or 
prejudice, even without mentioning race, was helpful in priming for 
egalitarianism.347  That study’s author concluded that “explicit race 
salience and egalitarianism may be additive, such that their com–
bination is more powerful at reducing biases than either alone.”348 
Similarly, attorneys can use voir dire or closing arguments to remind 
jurors to guard against biases, reinforcing egalitarianism without 
specifically referring to race.349 
A fourth strategy involves reducing cognitive loads.350 “Studies have 
shown that cognitive load interferes with the ability to process 
information in a controlled manner, making people more vulnerable to 
stereotyping and other mental shortcuts.”351 This occurs because people 
draw on the same mental resources for directing their attention, holding 
things in working memory, reasoning, and controlling expressions of 
bias.352 In such situations, relying on stereotypes provides a mental 
shortcut, but that heightens the risk of biased behavior.353 Reducing 
cognitive load, by contrast, minimizes the need for reliance on mental 
 
345. Ellis, supra note 283, at 500 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 504 (“Race 
consciousness can be constructive or destructive, and it is our choice as to 
whether to be complicit with an erasure of race consciousness that facilitates 
a new racial domination, or by our consciousness to work to articulate a 
racial awareness that bolsters our democratic values.”). 
346. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1276. 
347. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1730–31. 
348. Id. 
349. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1276. 
350. Jamillah Bowman Williams, Accountability as a Debiasing Strategy: Testing 
the Effect of Racial Diversity in Employment Committees, 103 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1593, 1601 (2018); see also Hunt, supra note 18, at 275 (“[L]owering 
the cognitive demands on jurors may help them to avoid the influence of 
prejudice.”). 
351. Avani Mehta Sood, Attempted Justice: Misunderstanding and Bias in 
Psychological Constructions of Criminal Attempt, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 593, 
648 (2019); see also Thompson, supra note 63, at 1249 (noting that high 
cognitive load makes individuals under stress or pressed for time more likely 
to rely on stereotypes). 
352. Jillian K. Swencionis & Phillip Atiba Goff, The Psychological Science of 
Racial Bias and Policing, 23 Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 398, 402 (2017). 
353. See id. 
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shortcuts like stereotypes and encourages more thoughtful decision-
making.354 
Finally, courts should provide opportunities for counter-narratives. 
Counter-narratives are a useful tool for replacing toxic prior mental 
associations with new, more positive associations.355 Professor Jewel’s 
article on neurorhetoric stresses the importance of counternarratives: 
“To the extent that rhetoric produces collective neural pathways that 
reinforce racial oppression and subordination, the identification and 
deployment of alternative discourses have the potential to carve out 
healing pathways that can reshape brains, both individually and 
collectively.”356 Many scholars have written about the importance of 
defense counsel offering counter-narratives to humanize their clients.357 
But there is also an important systemic component to counter-
narratives as a debiasing strategy.358 As discussed above, stereotypes 
come in part from culture, and repeated references to those stereotypes 
more firmly entrenches them in our individual and collective under–
standings.359 Law’s emphasis on repetition of rules and standardized 
language “creates collective neural pathways that become collectively 
entrenched.”360 Thus, in making race salient and priming egalitarianism, 
courts can foster counter-narratives within the criminal justice system. 
The next Part below offers concrete strategies for doing so. 
IV. Specific Proposed Solutions 
This section offers specific actions trial courts can use to implement 
the general debiasing strategies discussed above. Section A describes 
creating an effective foundation to guard against juror biases through 
voir dire and pretrial jury instructions. Section B proposes using a 
 
354. See Williams, supra note 350, at 1601 n.45. 
355. Walter I. Gonçalves, Jr., Narrative, Culture, and Individuation: A Criminal 
Defense Lawyer’s Race-Conscious Approach to Reduce Implicit Bias for 
Latinxs, 18 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 333, 374 (2020). 
356. Jewel, supra note 18, at 665. 
357. See, e.g., Gonçalves, Jr., supra note 355, at 338 (emphasizing the value of 
client-centered strategies such as “presenting important life experiences of 
the client” to humanize the client and “present [them] as a unique person”); 
Blasi, supra note 28, at 1270 (discussing the “bind” of defense counsel in 
deciding whether to present stereotype-inconsistent information about a 
client, which both helps the client by encouraging the jury to view the client 
as exceptional and also reinforces the broader stereotype). 
358. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 94, at 407 (discussing the value of “exposure 
to ‘counterstereotypes’” and arguing that cultural solutions must be 
pursued). 
359. See supra Parts I(B)(2) and I(B)(5). 
360. Jewel, supra note 18, at 681. 
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checklist of racist prosecutorial rhetoric and requiring prosecutors to 
bring a motion in limine when they believe that race is relevant to the 
case. That section should prevent much racist prosecutorial rhetoric, 
but not all, so Section C offers strategies for dealing with problems that 
occur during trial. Section D suggests a method for tracking violations 
across trials and offices to better facilitate dealing with repeat offenders. 
These solutions would work best in combination with one another, but 
even implementing some of these approaches would be a marked 
improvement over the current situation. 
A. Create an Effective Foundation 
The two strategies discussed in this section build on the race 
salience research described above to create a foundation for minimizing 
the effect of any racist prosecutorial rhetoric that might occur at trial. 
These solutions are specifically targeted at making the jury aware of 
implicit biases and on guard against relying on stereotypes or biases.361 
While these strategies focus on the jury, they should also help make 
race salient to prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges, which creates 
a foundation for the solutions discussed in subsequent sections that are 
focused on those actors. 
1. Use Voir Dire to Make Race Salient 
Courts can use voir dire to make race salient.362 While courts are 
only required to use voir dire to deal with racial bias in a limited set of 
cases, they have broad discretion to do so in any case.363 Some judges 
have been hesitant to use this authority, fearing that calling attention 
 
361. This approach is consistent with the theory in some of the sources on racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric that frame the issue as violating the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to an impartial jury. See, e.g., State v. Monday, 257 
P.3d 551, 557–58 (Wash. 2011); Calhoun v. United States, 568 U.S. 1206, 
1208 (2013) (statement of Sotomoyor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); 
see also Earle, supra note 34, at 1217–18 (arguing that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury requires a pragmatic focus on 
outcomes, while Equal Protection analysis bogs down over questions of a 
prosecutor’s intent and whether actions were harmless). It should also help 
prevent the kind of racist rhetoric used by a juror during deliberations in 
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, in which two jurors reported that a third juror, 
an ex-law enforcement officer, explicitly referenced that experience to argue 
that Mexican men “believe they could do whatever they wanted with 
women” and that “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being 
aggressive toward women and young girls.” 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). And 
even if it does not prevent such rhetoric, it should give the other jurors 
ammunition to explain why that approach should not be used in 
deliberations. See Cicchini, supra note 145, at 892. 
362. Lee, supra note 23, at 1590. Voir dire is the process of questioning jurors in 
advance of the jury selection process. See id. 
363. Id. at 1592; Thompson, supra note 63, at 1281 n.303. 
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to race will only exacerbate implicit bias.364 But the research on race 
salience described above demonstrates that instinct is incorrect; there 
is a far greater danger of implicit bias affecting decision-making when 
courts take a color-blind approach rather than making race salient.365 
If courts agree to use voir dire to address racial biases, they should 
allow attorneys for the parties to do the questioning on this topic, rather 
than doing it themselves.366 Research shows that jurors are more likely 
to answer attorneys more candidly but are more likely to give judges 
the answer that they think the judge wants to hear. 367  Therefore, 
judicially conducted voir dire may actually obscure rather than reveal 
some biases.368 
Whoever does the questioning, though, should be careful about how 
questions are phrased. Closed questions that ask jurors if they can be 
fair are unlikely to be helpful.369 Instead, questions should be open-
ended to educate jurors on implicit bias and ask them to reflect on it 
and guard against its impact.370 
2. Give Jury Instruction(s), including a Debiasing Instruction,       
Before Opening Statements 
Another common suggestion for making race salient is through the 
use of jury instructions.371 Many authors have offered a variety of 
different instructions that could be used for this purpose; 372  these 
 
364. Bennett, supra note 338, at 169. 
365. See supra notes 283, 322–338 and accompanying text. 
366. Bennett, supra note 338, at 160. For attorneys who would prefer to have 
the court conduct this voir dire, see infra note 370 and accompanying text. 
367. Bennett, supra note 338, at 160. 
368. Id. If judges choose to conduct voir dire on this topic, attorneys can still 
request permission to give potential jurors a questionnaire with race-relevant 
questions. Lee, supra note 23, at 1591. 
369. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 338, at 160 (suggesting that typical closed 
questions about fairness only reach explicit bias and do not do anything 
to help detect or prevent implicit biases); Lee, supra note 33, at 868. 
370. See, e.g., Gonçalves, Jr., supra note 355, at 354 (stressing that defense 
counsel should use voir dire to educate jurors about implicit bias); Lee, 
supra note 33, at 846–47 (stressing that jurors should reflect on how implicit 
bias could impact decision-making); Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 236 
(discussing social science research supporting the idea of asking jurors to 
reflect on racial biases during voir dire). 
371. See supra notes 338, 347–349 and accompanying text regarding effectively 
using jury instructions to make salient both race and egalitarianism. 
372. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 63, at 1301–06 (including an instruction on 
life experiences that does not mention race, as well as instructions on general 
racial stereotypes and specific stereotypes that have been invoked in a 
particular case); Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1718–19, 1730–33 (describing an 
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different models may be more or less appropriate in different cases.373 
Judges may want to have a standard instruction educating jurors on 
implicit bias and urging them to avoid relying on stereotypes or biases 
in their decision-making.374 This instruction should avoid language that 
inadvertently suggests that bias is inevitable or difficult to control, as 
well as any language with a moralizing tone.375 Prosecutors and defense 
counsel could argue for the appropriateness of additional instructions 
in specific cases. 
The best approach, however, would be to have committees on 
model jury instructions in each jurisdiction evaluate their current 
instructions and look for opportunities to refine their model instruc–
tions.376 A rules committee would be well-suited to focus on the clarity 
of the instruction, as clarity matters. Several studies demonstrate that 
 
experiment testing the effectiveness of a variety of different instructions, 
concluding that egalitarian and race-salience instructions were most effective 
when combined and rejecting the effectiveness of “self-affirming” or “proce–
dural justice” instructions); Bennett, supra note 338, at 169 n.85 (quoting the 
instruction that Judge Bennett gives routinely). Some of these instructions 
give detail about the ways in which implicit biases can affect judgments. See, 
e.g., Thompson, supra note 63, at 1302 (including specific language about 
biases affecting memory, judgments about believability, and decision-making). 
373. For example, Thompson’s instruction on life experiences would be useful in 
courts that routinely give a similar instruction or in cases in which the 
prosecutor argued that jurors should rely on their life experiences in making 
credibility determinations between people of different races. See Thompson, 
supra note 63, at 1301. 
374. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 338, at 169 n.85 (containing Judge Bennett’s 
standard instruction, which among other things asks jurors “to recognize 
that all of us may be affected by implicit biases in the decisions that we 
make. Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I 
strongly encourage you to critically evaluate the evidence and resist any 
urge to reach a verdict influenced by stereotypes, generalizations, or implicit 
biases.”). Judge Bennett’s standard instruction is fairly similar in approach, 
although with slightly different language, to the egalitarian instruction that 
Ingriselli found to reduce bias. See supra notes 347–348 and accompanying 
text. 
375. For example, both Judge Bennett’s instruction and Ingriselli’s egalitarian 
instruction refers to “unconscious bias,” but “implicit bias” would be better 
language to use, and courts should avoid language about biases being 
difficult to control. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
376. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1290. Thompson has an extended discussion of 
pattern jury instructions in various jurisdictions; that approach seems benefi–
cial because these instructions are produced through a deliberative process. 
Id. at 1290–93. Additionally, trial courts would clearly be authorized to give 
these instructions, while they are sometimes reluctant to do so in the absence 
of a model instruction. See, e.g., State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 817 (Iowa 
2017) (noting that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested implicit 
bias instruction because the trial court wrongly concluded that it did not have 
the authority to do so). 
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legal standard instructions can be hard for jurors to understand.377 
When jurors have difficulty understanding the instructions, those 
instructions are less effective.378 
Beyond the language used, courts should also focus on timing. The 
research indicates that it is more effective to give jury instructions 
generally, and debiasing instructions in particular, before the jury hears 
evidence. 379  When jurors are given instructions before they hear 
evidence, those instructions provide a framework for evaluating the 
evidence and help them focus on and remember relevant evidence rather 
than improper considerations such as race.380 Relatedly, pre-evidence 
instructions “prime jurors to organize the evidence according to legal 
principles rather than personal biases.”381 
An empirical study supported these conclusions, showing a greater 
debiasing effect when debiasing instructions were given before the 
evidence as compared to when those instructions were given after the 
evidence.382 The study’s author also found that “explicit race salience 
only mattered when there were egalitarian instructions presented pre-
evidence”; in other words, explicit race salience was not enough without 
also priming egalitarianism before the jurors heard the evi–
dence. 383  Another study indicates that providing jury instructions 
 
377. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1716. 
378. Id. at 1716–17. 
379. See id. at 1730–31; Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on 
Seven Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second 
Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 423, 439–40 (1985) (describing experiments in 
real trials, explaining that judges and counsel in the majority of cases overall 
and all the criminal cases found preinstruction to be helpful). While some 
participants in these experiments expressed ambivalence, the study’s author 
concluded “that most, if not all, of the ambivalence toward preinstruction 
stems from unfamiliarity with the procedure and the increased burden it may 
place on the court and counsel. Not a single respondent pointed to any 
negative effect of preinstruction on the jury.” Id. at 442. 
380. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1715; see also Sand & Reiss, supra note 379, at 
438 (footnote omitted) (“[B]ecause attention and memory processes are more 
acute when a perceiver has an understanding of what he or she is looking 
for, preinstruction may enhance the jurors’ ability to remember the 
information presented at trial.”). 
381. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1715. 
382. Id. at 1729. Ingriselli also found that timing intersects with clarity: “Timing 
should have less of an effect if jurors do not understand the instructions, as 
they cannot form a framework within which to evaluate evidence regardless 
of when the instructions are presented.” Id. at 1716. 
383. Id. at 1731. That finding conflicts at least to some extent with earlier 
research on race salience; Ingriselli suggests that prior studies of race 
salience used interracial crimes, while her hypothetical did not. Id. She 
concludes that because she “excluded the victim’s race in order to avoid 
this confounding factor, the data suggests that perhaps the results from past 
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before opening statements can also help focus counsel on the issues 
presented in the case, similar to the effect of a pretrial conference.384 
The Supreme Court recently noted with approval the process of 
instructing the jury “at the outset of the case” as one of several things 
that can help reduce racial bias in jury deliberations.385 Thus, courts 
should give some debiasing instruction prior to opening statements in 
cases where the social science research indicates that race could affect 
juror decision-making without their awareness.386 
B. Prevent Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric 
This section focuses on strategies for preventing the use of racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric during trials. It aims to give prosecutors and 
judges the necessary tools to recognize rhetoric that is racist and the 
incentives to use those tools effectively. 387  Specifically, this section 
proposes that judges adopt a checklist that clearly identifies racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric and flatly prohibits the use of most of this 
rhetoric at trial, while also providing a mechanism for prosecutors to 
argue race-sensitive issues in individual cases when appropriate. The 
checklist would help well-intentioned prosecutors avoid inadvertent use 
of racist rhetoric, and it would make it easier for judges to provide 
remedies when prosecutors do use that rhetoric. Additionally, the 
checklist would put prosecutors on notice that they need to file a motion 
in limine seeking permission to raise racial issues and to clarify the 
boundaries of appropriate argument, so that individual cases can be 
treated appropriately while still generally preventing improper argu–
ment. 
1. Use a Checklist to Clarify What Language is Potentially Racist 
Checklists have long been recognized as a valuable tool for avoiding 
biased decision-making. Legal decision-makers have relied on studies in 
the medical context about how use of checklists can improve decision-
 
studies have been driven in part by an interaction between the defendant’s 
race and the victim’s race rather than by explicit race salience alone.” Id. 
384. Sand & Reiss, supra note 379, at 441. 
385. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017). 
386. The debiasing instruction should be given in conjunction with other 
foundational instructions, such as the reasonable doubt standard, rather 
than by itself. See Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1730. That was the design in 
Ingriselli’s study, although she does not discuss it separately. However, it is 
logical that a debiasing instruction would be connected to other instructions 
about how jurors should decide, rather than talking only about race or bias. 
387. See Markovitz, supra note 307, at 933 (“[P]art of the effort to curtail the 
influence of racist stereotyping in self-defense determinations must involve 
providing judges and prosecutors with resources and incentives to take an 
active role in identifying the problem”). 
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making by supporting good performance rather than threatening 
punishment for poor performance.388 “Checklists can help reduce biased 
judgments because having predetermined criteria to guide decision-
making can hinder people’s unintentional tendency to change the 
criteria upon which their decisions are based in order to fit their 
preferred course of action.”389 
A checklist in this context would provide some clarity around 
rhetoric that is inherently racist, although of course line-drawing would 
be challenging. It is fairly easy to say that some references, such as the 
explicit use of racial slurs, should be prohibited, but “subtle racist 
appeals that could be interpreted as having nonracist meanings” are 
more difficult to deal with.390 Various scholars have suggested ways to 
categorize racist rhetoric; these approaches all have their own strengths 
and weaknesses.391 Courts adopting their own checklists may want to 
consider these other approaches, but this article proposes a structure 
based on whether or not the prosecutor explicitly refers to race or a 
racial stereotype, whether the prosecutor uses coded language to do so, 
and whether the racial reference has more probative value than 
prejudicial effect. Each of these categories is explained in more detail 
below, with examples drawn from reported cases to illustrate how the 
categories would work; it is impossible to be comprehensive, however, 
so readers should not conclude that potential examples not included 
below would be appropriate.392 Appendix A provides a sample checklist 
using these categories that courts could adopt or modify. 
 
388. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Jennifer Blasser, Keith A. Findley, Ronald F. 
Wright, Jennifer E. Laurin & Cookie Ridolfi, New Perspectives on Brady 
and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best 
Practices, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1974–75 (2010) (explaining an ABA 
report relying on Continuous Quality Improvement studies in medicine); 
Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference Is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in 
Material-Witness Detentions, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1333, 1380–81 (2012) 
(discussing use of checklists to improve decision-making, including a project 
in the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office to create conviction integrity 
programs using similar principles); Richardson, supra note 22, at 891 
(discussing the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office use of checklists to 
help attorneys guard against implicit bias in their handling of cases). 
389. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public 
Defender Triage, 122 Yale L.J. 2626, 2645 (2013). 
390. Markovitz, supra note 307, at 932. 
391. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 68, at 767–68 (summarizing some of the earlier 
approaches, including tests that focus on symbolism and cultural meaning); 
Earle, supra note 34, at 1233–40 (discussing different strategies for handling 
explicit references to race versus indirect references to race). 
392. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1303. 
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a. Prohibit Use of Racial Slurs and Explicit References to Stereotypes 
First, and hopefully uncontroversially, courts should absolutely 
prohibit prosecutors from using racial slurs. “Racial slurs universally 
are considered prejudicial and therefore impermissible.”393 For example, 
the prosecutor’s use of a variant of the n-word to mean hatred of Black 
people would fall under this absolute prohibition.394 There is no place 
for prosecutors to use racial slurs in their arguments. Even when the 
slur comes from the defendant’s language or that of a witness, the 
prosecutor can refer to “the slur” rather than repeating the language.395 
Additionally, courts should absolutely prohibit prosecutors from 
explicitly appealing to stereotypes. For example, the use of animal 
imagery should be prohibited.396 As discussed above, courts sometimes 
justify a prosecutor’s comparison of the defendant to a Bengal tiger, a 
rabid dog, or a snake, to give just a few examples.397  Prosecutors 
sometimes use movie references to similar effect, such as referring to 
King Kong or calling the defendant a monster. 398  While “[v]ivid 
expression and exaggeration for effect are many an attorney’s stock-in-
trade,”399 use of this imagery activates the most pernicious stereotypes 
and appeals to emotions in ways that are likely to anesthetize the jury 
from resisting dehumanization.400 Dehumanization is particularly likely 
to invoke stereotypes and influence the jury when used against 
defendants of color, and this dehumanizing rhetoric is never necessary 
for prosecutors to argue their cases. Courts should require prosecutors 
to look for ways to frame their arguments that focus on the specific 
 
393. Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process: VI. Racial 
Bias and Prosecutorial Conduct at Trial, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1588, 1590 
(1988). 
394. See Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 504 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). I am not 
suggesting that the prosecutor could not elicit witness testimony about a 
defendant’s use of racial slurs. 
395. That was apparently the situation in Ivery; the prosecutor apparently intended 
to argue that Black victims deserve justice. In cases involving testimony about 
a defendant’s or witness’s use of racial slurs, that issue should be analyzed 
under Evidence Rule 403, but the prosecutor can emphasize the slur in 
argument without repeating it. 
396. See Heller, supra note 19. 
397. See supra notes 213–225 and accompanying text. 
398. See, e.g., Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 2016) (involving both 
King Kong and monster references); Lyon, supra note 15, at 330 (discussing a 
case where the prosecutor referred to the movie “Gorillas in the Mist” to invoke 
the “black ape” stereotype). 
399. Bennett, 842 F.3d at 322. 
400. See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text (discussing Jewel’s explana–
tion for the effectiveness of dehumanizing rhetoric in Nazi Germany). 
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evidence.401 For example, prosecutors can argue the viciousness of the 
crime without using an animal or monster image for the perpetrator.402 
Similarly, courts should prohibit other language that directly 
invokes racial stereotypes. For example, Professor Sherri Lynn Johnson 
described several cases with explicit invocation of racial stereotypes, 
such as referring to Native Americans committing crimes because they 
are unable to handle liquor.403 Similarly, the prosecutor who sang a 
Dixie song referencing “the land of cotton” invoked slavery and the 
range of stereotypes associated with it.404 And several cases discussed 
above played on stereotypes of sexually inappropriate behavior towards 
white women, while some cases involved inflammatory language about 
immigration status and dishonesty.405 Prosecutors should stick to the 
facts of the cases at hand rather than contextualizing them within 
broader narratives founded on these stereotypes. 
Courts should also prohibit explicit references to race that, in 
context, suggest that the crime is worse because of the race of the 
participants involved. As discussed above, this line of argument often 
comes up in sexual assault cases, where the prosecutors link the victim’s 
fear to the race of the perpetrator.406 Prosecutors also sometimes argue 
that the reaction of others to the victim’s sexual assault will be worse 
because of race.407 For example, one prosecutor argued, “I want you to 
 
401. In doing so, prosecutors should not explicitly reference race or invoke the 
stereotype of Black men as particularly violent, as the United States Supreme 
Court has recently confirmed that such an approach is improper. Buck v. 
Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (reasoning that it was ineffective assistance 
of counsel for defense counsel in a capital case to put on testimony of an 
expert witness who relied on the defendant’s race as an aggravating factor 
suggesting future dangerousness, and noting that “[i]t would be patently 
unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future 
danger because of his race”). The Court noted that the witness’s “testimony 
appealed to a powerful racial stereotype—that of black men as ‘violence 
prone’” and called that argument “a particularly noxious strain of racial 
prejudice.” Id. at 776. 
402. See, e.g., Bennett, 842 F.3d at 325 (giving several examples of how the 
improper arguments in that case could have been rephrased in race-neutral 
ways that avoided appealing to stereotypes). 
403. Johnson, supra note 137, at 1752–53. 
404. See State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 1214, 1216 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). 
405. See supra notes 202, 207–211. 
406. See, e.g., State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 610 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (involv–
ing repeated references to the victim as a “local woman” and then linking 
her fear of the defendants to their race). 
407. See, e.g., State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1238, 1242 (Haw. 1999) (reversing 
the defendant’s conviction based on the prosecutor’s argument that it is 
“every mother’s nightmare . . . [to find] some black, military guy on top of 
your daughter”); Lyon, supra note 15, at 328–29 (quoting State v. Richmond, 
904 P.2d. 974, 983 (Kan. 1995)) (describing cases where prosecutors argued, 
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think about how embarrassing it is for an 18-year-old white girl from 
Crestview to admit she was raped by a black man. It is humiliating.”408 
In these cases, the references to the perpetrator’s race are not made to 
help identify the perpetrator or for any other legitimate purpose, but 
instead to suggest that the victim’s shame or trauma would be worse 
based on the race of the perpetrator and that those around her would 
react accordingly. The court’s checklist should prohibit these arguments 
linking race to the severity of the crime. 
b. Coded Language to Invoke Race or Stereotypes 
Courts should also prohibit coded language that more subtly 
invokes stereotypes. Again, the line between explicit appeals and more 
subtle use of coded language may be difficult to draw, but my focus 
here is on language that prosecutors might argue is not a reference to 
race or stereotypes at all.409 This section does not try to cover every 
type of coded appeal, but instead should help courts recognize coded 
appeals generally. 
One foundational category of coded appeals involves use of us/them 
rhetoric. As explained above, ingroup/outgroup bias is a foundational 
concept for understanding how race affects decision-making; people 
tend to make more positive judgments about others within one’s 
ingroup and make more negative judgments against those not part of 
that group.410 Us/them arguments sometimes emphasize the ingroup 
status of the victim, such as in the case in Hawaii where the prosecutor 
repeatedly referred to the victim as a “local woman.”411 More com–
 
for example, to “[t]hink about having to divulge to your husband that you 
were raped by a black male. Think about having to divulge that information 
to law enforcement.”). 
408. Lyon, supra note 15, at 330 (discussing State v. Reynolds, 580 So. 2d 254, 
256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)). 
409. Well-intentioned prosecutors may not recognize the racial dimensions of the 
arguments discussed in this section, but courts should focus on impact 
rather than intent; the rhetoric discussed in this section is likely to activate 
juror stereotypes. This section should therefore also help educate well-
intentioned prosecutors, who can therefore choose to avoid this racist 
rhetoric. 
410. See supra Part I(B)(1); see also Earle, supra note 34, at 1234 (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (“By creating 
a ‘we’ and a ‘they,’ the prosecutor can induce jurors to decide the case based 
upon stereotyped beliefs about other racial groups. Because ‘our system of 
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness,’ 
this kind of reference merits serious scrutiny.”). 
411. See, e.g., Shabazz, 48 P.3d at 622 (referring to prosecutor’s statement 
describing the victim as a “local woman” to appeal to the jurors’ ingroup 
biases while referring to the defendants as “African-Americans”). In a few 
cases, the prosecutors used ingroup/outgroup biases against defense counsel, 
such as when the Black prosecutor argued that defense counsel’s argument 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial 
103 
monly, the prosecutor’s language stresses the defendant as a member of 
an outgroup; for example, a prosecutor argued that the relevant 
standard was “what would a reasonable person do under the 
circumstances, not the culture that these people live in.”412 References 
to “anti-snitching codes” can also be argued in a racially coded way.413 
Similarly, one court noted a prosecutor’s statements that repeatedly 
focused on the defendant’s immigration status to suggest he was lying 
“went far beyond arguing that [the defendant] should not be trusted 
because he uses a false identity. The government’s repeated references 
to [his] status reinforced to the jury his foreign origin.”414 
Relatedly, courts should beware of language that appeals to jurors 
as a group in a way that positions the defendant on the other side of 
the ingroup/outgroup line. For example, the prosecutor in one case 
emphasized that the defendant was from the South Side of Chicago 
while the victim of the case lived on the North Side of Chicago, where 
the case was tried.415 The prosecutor stated that there was “no reason 
for him to be there except to cause trouble, to look for some victim” 
and concluded with the statement, “you decide whether to protect your 
streets, your community from [the defendant].”416 This argument should  
that the defendant had been misidentified was based on the idea that “we 
all look alike” and contrasted “Mr. Boss’s [(defense counsel’s)] world” with 
the witness’s “world.” United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735–36 
(D.C. Cir. 1998). 
412. State v. Graves, 442 P.3d 1228, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 2019) (referring to the 
prosecutor’s statement, “that’s the way these people talk”); see also United 
States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996) (referring to the 
prosecutor’s statements describing the defendants as “bad people” and then 
arguing that there are many bad people in the world, and “[w]e are lucky 
where we live not to come in contact with as many as there may be in other 
parts of the country. But there are still some around here.”); Prasad, supra 
note 49, at 3107–08 (giving examples of other cases with “these people” 
language). 
413. Compare State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011) (concluding 
that the prosecutor inappropriately linked “this code to ‘black folk’ only” 
when “[c]ommentators suggest the ‘no snitching’ movement is very broad”), 
with United States v. Weekes, 224 F. App’x 200, 207 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(alterations in original) (concluding that prosecutor reasonably inferred that 
there was a “street code that says you don’t talk. You don’t become an 
eyewitness” because the defendant had testified “nobody [is] going to talk 
about that in [my neighborhood]”). 
414. United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted). 
415. Lyon, supra note 15, at 328. 
416. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Johnson, 581 N.E.2d 118, 126 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). The court rejected the defendant’s arguments that 
these were appeals to racial prejudice, holding that it was “not improper for 
the State to comment unfavorably upon the defendant or to urge the fearless 
administration of the law.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 581 N.E.2d at 127). This 
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have been treated as improper, because arguments “that identify the 
defendant as a threat to the community . . . serve to motivate jurors 
to punish the defendant (and to protect the community) by returning 
a guilty verdict.”417 
Prosecutors are also likely activating outgroup biases when they use 
coded language that calls unnecessary attention to the defendant’s race. 
For example, one author noted that “[p]rosecutors have called attention 
to the Blackness of the defendant by making extraneous references to 
African American hairstyles . . . [or] the fact that a defendant lives in 
a segregated Black neighborhood.”418 The Washington Supreme Court 
concluded that use of “po-leese” rather than “police” was a coded racial 
appeal.419 The Seventh Circuit should have reached (but did not) the 
same conclusion about the prosecutor’s references to “shucking and 
jiving” about a Black witness and “Superfly” about a Black defen–
dant.420 Prosecutors also make inappropriate racially coded references 
by referring to the “inner city” or calling the defendant a “thug” or 
“hoodlum.”421 These references, while not as explicitly racist as the 
comments discussed in subsection (a) above, still have the power to 
activate stereotypes and affect decision-making. 
c. Balancing the Probative Value Against the Prejudicial Effect of 
Racial Language 
Although courts should prohibit racist prosecutorial rhetoric to the 
greatest possible extent, some references to race are inevitable; this 
 
analysis, however, fails to recognize the power of ingroup/outgroup biases; 
the court should have held that these comments were improper. 
417. Alford, supra note 39, at 333. While we/they language may not always have 
racist overtones, prosecutors should nevertheless avoid this rhetorical 
approach in all cases, for the reasons explained in note 409 above. Prosecutors 
should focus on the evidence of the individual defendant’s guilt, without 
invoking group membership to motivate the jury. 
418. Id. at 353 (first citing United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 
152, 160 (2d Cir. 1973); and then citing People v. Brown, 229 N.E.2d 922, 
926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967)). 
419. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011) (“[T]he only reason to 
use the word ‘poleese’ was to subtly, and likely deliberately, call to the 
jury’s attention that the witness was African American and to emphasize 
the prosecutor’s contention that ‘black folk don’t testify against black folk.’ 
. . . This conduct was highly improper.”). 
420. Lyon, supra note 15, at 327 (discussing Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663 
(7th Cir. 1995)). 
421. Prasad, supra note 49, at 3098 (footnotes omitted) (noting that “inner-city,” 
“welfare queens,” and “thugs” all allude to race without being explicit); 
Cicchini, supra note 145 at 900 (footnotes omitted) (noting that “dope 
pusher” and “‘hoodlum’ . . . could very well be considered inflammatory, 
improper, and even reversible error”). 
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subsection should help courts and prosecutors recognize the line 
between proper and improper references to race. Fundamentally, courts 
should prohibit references to race that appeal “to passion and prejudice” 
while allowing references to race that refer to “facts and law.”422 In other 
words, courts should be looking at whether a prosecutor’s reference to 
race appeals to bias.423 
In determining whether a prosecutor’s racial language appeals to 
bias, courts should think about the probative value of the prosecutor’s 
reference as compared to the likely prejudicial effect.424 This approach 
is similar to the balancing courts do under Evidence Rule 403, although 
courts should be careful not to overestimate relevance or discount the 
potential prejudice from such evidence. 425  One author convincingly 
argues that the probative value should have to substantially outweigh 
the prejudicial effect, although that is the reverse of the typical 
approach under Rule 403, which normally requires the prejudicial effect 
to substantially outweigh the probative value in order to justify 
exclusion.426 
When focusing on relevance, courts should analyze the evidentiary 
support for the reference to race. For example, if a case involves an 
issue about the validity of cross-racial identification, there will need to 
be more discussion of race than in a case that does not involve such an 
issue.427 And a limited reference to race for purpose of identity would 
often make sense. However, if identity is not disputed in a particular 
case, then even a single reference to race would not be justified based 
 
422. Earle, supra note 34, at 1222. As Earle correctly points out, however, “the 
problem for courts lies not in recognizing this distinction, but in determining 
into which category a racial reference falls.” Id. 
423. See Armour, supra note 68, at 768 (“Group references that exploit, 
exacerbate, or play on the prevailing stereotypes that factfinders carry with 
them into the jury box subvert the rationality of the fact-finding process. 
But references that challenge the factfinders to reexamine and resist their 
discriminatory responses enhance the rationality of the fact-finding 
process.”); Cialeo, supra note 286, at 447 (arguing that except in cases with 
a racially-motivated crime, attorneys should not be able to ask leading 
questions that “exhibit or are intended to appeal to or engender bias” in 
cross-examining witnesses or when dealing with hostile witnesses on direct 
exam). While Cialeo is focused on questioning witnesses, the same framework 
is helpful when thinking more broadly about racist prosecutorial rhetoric. 
424. See Earle, supra note 34, at 1234–36 (analogizing to Rule 403 analysis of 
balancing probative value and prejudicial effect in trying to create a bright 
line between neutral and non-neutral references to race). 
425. See id. at 1230–31. 
426. See id. at 1234–35 (discussing both Rule 403 and her proposed approach 
without noting the reversal of the balancing test in her argument). 
427. United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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on showing identity.428 Additionally, race will be relevant in cases where 
there is evidence to suggest that the defendant’s motive for the crime 
was racial.429 But in all these circumstances, courts should make sure 
that the relevance of race is based on actual evidence, rather than 
speculation.430 
Additionally, courts should focus on the ways in which the 
prosecutor handles these issues when analyzing prejudicial effect. As 
noted above, repetition is a key rhetorical tool for affecting decision-
making,431 so courts should be particularly skeptical of unnecessary 
repetition of racial references. For example, the court in State v. 
Mitchell should have seen the sixteen references to Black males of 
various sizes in opening argument as prejudicial, even if a single 
reference would have been justified as being relevant to the identity 
issue in the case.432 Similarly, even if a single reference to a defendant 
being Black is relevant for identity purposes, that does not excuse the 
highly prejudicial effect of repeatedly emphasizing that the victim or 
the arresting officer in a case is white.433 
When considering prejudice, courts should also focus on the specific 
language used. As discussed above, coded language can invoke stereo–
types, so prosecutors should be using race-neutral rather than 
 
428. See State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1240 (Haw. 1999) (noting that identity 
was not an issue, so the lower courts’ reliance on identity to justify racial 
reference was improper). 
429. See, e.g., Cialeo, supra note 286, at 447 (talking about how crimes involving 
racial motives will need to be treated differently); see also supra note 307 
and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the defendant claims self-
defense based on racial fear; the prosecution in those cases needs to be able 
to argue the ways in which race does not justify the defendant’s fear). 
430. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit wrongly decided Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 
826 (7th Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit justified the prosecutor’s repeated 
questions about racial motive for shooting police officers, and then stated 
that the questions were harmless because the witnesses all denied the racial 
motivation. Aliwoli, 225 F.3d at 831. The court failed to recognize that the 
prosecutor never had any evidentiary basis on which to ask the questions. 
See also Developments in the Law, supra note 393, at 1591–92. There, the 
authors discuss an earlier case in which a federal district court held that the 
prosecutor’s theory of the case violated due process. The prosecutor argued 
that the two Black defendants killed the white victim because of racial 
revenge for a murder of a white victim earlier the same day in the same 
city, without any evidence linking the two cases—just resting on the 
assumption of motive based on the race of the defendants and victims. 
431. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
432. See State v. Mitchell, 783 A.2d 1249, 1258 (Conn. Ct. App. 2001); see also 
Earle, supra note 34, at 1235 (arguing that “gratuitous” references to race, 
“which by definition adds nothing to the trial, would be inadmissible under 
Rule 402”).  
433. Developments in the Law, supra note 393, at 1590. 
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inflammatory language as much as possible. For example, a prosecutor 
can focus on the evidence of brutality of the crime without analogizing 
the defendant to an animal in doing so.434 Additionally, a prosecutor 
can argue that people refused to come forward because of anti-snitching 
norms without attributing that “code” to people of a particular race.435 
Prosecutors should also focus on the individual defendant(s) without 
making broader references to “these people.”436 And prosecutors should 
be careful in sexual assault cases that their limited references to identity 
does not suggest that the racial identity of the defendant or victim 
somehow makes the crime worse. Courts should also remember that 
denying something is about race is a rhetorical device that can invoke 
prejudicial responses.437 
2. Require a Motion in Limine by Prosecutors for Proposed References 
to Race on a Case-by-Case Basis 
While courts could in some instances evaluate these line-drawing 
issues during the flow of trial, the better practice is to require 
prosecutors to bring a motion in limine in advance to justify their 
planned use of race. Some commentators urge defense counsel to file a 
motion in limine prohibiting references to race,438 but the better practice 
would be to have prosecutors bring that motion seeking permission to 
reference race either explicitly or implicitly. 
Judge Furman of the Colorado Court of Appeals recently advocated 
for this approach: “Parties should give notice of their intent to 
introduce evidence or argument related to race and should have to 
overcome a presumption that such evidence is irrelevant.” 439  This 
approach would help both parties articulate their arguments, which can 
help prosecutors focus on drawing appropriate lines and can make it 
easier for defense counsel to respond. It would also help trial courts by 
 
434. Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The prosecutor easily 
could have highlighted Bennett’s physical attributes in a race-neutral man–
ner. There was no impediment to the prosecutor’s ability to note ‘repeated 
examples of [Bennett’s] proclivity to viciously and savagely attack others 
defenseless to someone of his size.’ Indeed, the prosecutor did so in a race-
neutral manner before the earlier mixed-race jury.”) (citations omitted). 
435. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011). 
436. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 442 P.3d 1228, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 2019) 
(“[T]hat’s the way these people talk.”). 
437. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
438. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 19, at 893. 
439. People v. Robinson, 459 P.3d 605, 615 (Colo. App. 2017) (Furman, J., 
concurring), rev’d and remanded, 454 P.3d 229 (Colo. 2019). Unfortunately, 
the Colorado Supreme Court declined to adopt this approach and overruled 
the court of appeals’ decision to reverse the defendant’s conviction, holding 
that any error was harmless. Robinson, 454 P.3d. at 236. 
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providing briefing on the issue and giving judges more time to decide 
the issue than the court would have in ruling on an objection during 
trial.440 Trial courts could then provide clearer directions about what 
“is relevant and appropriate and help ensure that evidence or argument 
related to race is only used for a proper and limited purpose.”441 This 
approach would also provide a clearer record for appellate review.442 
For example, a motion in limine would be particularly helpful in 
cases where the prosecutor’s theory involves race as a motive. Courts 
could require prosecutors to make an offer of proof about the 
evidentiary support for that theory to ensure that prosecutors were not 
simply relying on speculation. For example, in Aliwoli v. Carter, the 
Seventh Circuit approved of the prosecutor’s questions about whether 
the defendant’s beliefs as a Black Muslim gave him reason to shoot 
police officers; the prosecutor argued that these questions were proper 
to rebut the defendant’s insanity defense.443 If the court had required 
the prosecution to provide an offer of proof demonstrating the eviden–
tiary basis for that theory, the court should have realized the prosecutor 
was relying on speculation and prohibited the prosecution from asking 
questions on this topic of several witnesses, all of whom denied that the 
defendant’s race and “religion played any role in the crime . . . and 
characterized black Muslims as peaceful and law-abiding citizens.”444 
A motion in limine would also help clarify the appropriate 
boundaries for arguments referring to places that could be seen as 
invoking racial stereotypes. For example, in State v. Graves, the 
prosecutor in Utah mentioned the defendant’s Puerto Rican heritage 
fifty-seven times in a two-day trial, including forty-eight times during 
the second day.445 The court concluded that some of these references 
were justified because they referred to the defendant’s own alleged 
statement at the time of the shooting that “[t]his is how we do it in 
Puerto Rico,” which the prosecution contended showed that the 
defendant fired the gun deliberately rather than accidentally. 446  A 
pretrial motion could have helped resolve a dispute over the validity of 
that argument as well as a factual question of whether the defendant 
 
440. Jennifer M. Miller, To Argue Is Human, to Exclude, Divine: The Role of 
Motions in Limine and the Importance of Preserving the Record on Appeal, 
32 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 541, 541 (2009). 
441. Robinson, 459 P.3d at 615 (Furman, J., concurring). 
442. Id. 
443. Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2000). 
444. Id.; see also supra notes 193, 429–430 and accompanying text (regarding 
the evidentiary basis for motive arguments). 
445. State v. Graves, 442 P.3d 1228, 1234 (Utah 2019). 
446. Id. at 1232, 1234.  
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had ever made that statement.447 A motion in limine could also have 
helped clarify which references were more probative than prejudicial, 
whether any of the specific contexts of the references were particularly 
prejudicial, and whether the cumulative effect was likely to be 
problematic such that the prosecutor should have found other ways to 
discuss the issues. 
A motion in limine can also be particularly helpful in addressing 
the appropriate boundaries of prosecutor arguments that respond to 
defense counsel’s theories. Many courts justify even fairly extreme 
prosecutorial comments as appropriate responses to defense counsel’s 
arguments.448 For example, State v. Cabrera involved issues about gang 
membership of the defendants and various witnesses, and the 
prosecutor and defense attorneys had different theories about the pro–
bative value and prejudicial effect of that evidence.449 The prosecutor 
argued that some of its witnesses had been in gangs but were now trying 
to get on with their lives, and the prosecutor accused defense counsel 
of engaging in “wild, and I submit, racist speculation” about their 
current gang involvement. 450  The prosecutor characterized defense 
counsel’s argument as follows: “He’s a big, strong black man, but he’s 
a rough character. Members of the Jury, this is not about race.”451 The 
appellate court held that this language and the trial judge’s decision to 
overrule the defense’s objection “may have led the jury to conclude that 
defense counsel himself was racist—an implication wholly unsupported 
by the record.”452 A motion in limine could have helped both sides 
determine the appropriate boundaries of how to talk about gang 
membership and its potential connections to race, and it could also have 
helped the trial court recognize the prosecution’s escalation of the 
 
447. See id. at 1235 (noting that Graves denied having ever made the statement 
and witnesses were inconsistent in their recollection of it). Even if the court 
had allowed the prosecutor to ask about the statement, the court could 
have cautioned the prosecutor about how to handle the conflicting evidence 
about the statement rather than simply asserting that defendant had said 
it. And a motion in limine combined with the checklist proposed in this 
article might have either deterred the prosecutor from making references to 
“these people” or put defense counsel and the trial court on notice about 
the need to step in. 
448. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 179–82 (1986) (justifying 
prosecutor’s comment, that defendant was an animal who should not leave 
his cell unless he was on a leash, on the grounds that it was “responsive to 
the opening summation of the defense,” who argued that some other person 
committed the crime and that perpetrator was an animal). 
449. State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 472–74 (Minn. 2005). 
450. Id. at 474. 
451. Id. 
452. Id. at 475. 
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argument about the evidence into a rhetorical device invoking racial 
stereotypes and blaming the other side for it. Similarly, a motion in 
limine could help ensure that the prosecutor responds to the substance 
of defense counsel’s argument rather than simply invoking a stereo–
type.453 
C. Responses When Problems Arise at Trial 
If courts adopt the checklist and motion in limine requirements 
discussed above, that should prevent many instances of racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric, but some issues will still come up at trial.454 This 
section is designed to help courts think through how to respond to those 
issues. 
1. Act Sua Sponte When a Problem Occurs Rather Than            
Requiring an Objection 
Historically, trial courts have very rarely sua sponte reprimanded 
prosecutors for racist rhetoric.455 But given the realities described above, 
courts should be more willing to step in rather than waiting for defense 
counsel to object. As discussed above, defense counsel may have a 
variety of reasons for not objecting, including fear of the trial court 
validating that rhetoric by overruling the objection and fear of being 
seen as the one playing the race card.456 The North Carolina Supreme 
Court acknowledged defense counsel’s challenges and concluded that it 
is therefore “incumbent on the trial court to monitor vigilantly the 
 
453. See United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(defense’s theory was that the defendant had been mis-identified, and the 
prosecutor responded by arguing essentially that defense counsel thought 
all Black people look alike). A motion in limine regarding the prosecution’s 
proper response to the mis-identification theory should have helped both 
the prosecutor and the court ensure that the prosecutor’s response focused 
on the evidence showing that the identification was correct rather than 
merely arguing that defense counsel was being racist. People v. Dizon, 697 
N.E.2d 780, 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (treating prosecutor’s references to 
south Asian cultures and Latinos, which occurred during a discussion of 
gangs, as invited by the defense’s misidentification theory). A motion in 
limine could have helped the parties focus more clearly on the identifi–
cation issues and helped the prosecutor and the court avoid mixing up the 
different Asian groups discussed. 
454. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 459 P.3d 605, 615 (Colo. App. 2017) (Furman, 
J., concurring), rev’d 454 P.3d 229 (Colo. 2019) (acknowledging that a 
witness might unexpectedly introduce racial evidence at trial). Prosecutors 
may also make racial references at trial, deliberately or inadvertently, not–
withstanding the procedures discussed above. 
455. See Alford, supra note 39, at 337. 
456. See supra notes 260–263 and accompanying text. 
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course of such arguments [and] to intervene as warranted.”457 The court 
further stated that “it becomes the duty of the trial judge to intervene 
to stop improper argument and to instruct the jury not to consider it” 
when, among other things, the prosecutor “become[s] abusive.”458 
The checklist described above should help courts recognize when to 
intervene, particularly when prosecutors use racial slurs or animal 
imagery, or when prosecutors repeatedly reference the race of the 
participants beyond what is strictly necessary. In such circumstances, 
defense counsel may object, but trial courts should be willing to step in 
even in the absence of an objection. 
2. Admonish the Prosecutor in Front of the Jury for Appealing to Bias 
and Give a Specific Curative Instruction 
Regardless of whether defense counsel objects or the trial court 
intervenes sua sponte, trial courts should actively confront racist 
language head-on rather than reinforcing colorblind narratives. 
“Attempts at being colorblind can exacerbate the power of implicit 
racial biases because ignoring race can cause automatic engagement of 
stereotype-congruent responses.”459 Therefore, jurors are less likely to 
be influenced by racist prosecutorial rhetoric when courts flag the racial 
dimension, rather than simply sustaining an objection or using a more 
generic label like “inflammatory.” 460  This labeling is particularly 
important for “more subtle expressions of prejudice.” 461  Therefore, 
courts should make clear to the jury that the language used might 
trigger reactions based on bias or stereotype.462 
 
457. State v. Jones, 558 S.E.2d 97, 105 (N.C. 2002). The court also talked about 
entertaining and responding to objections. Id. But the issue in the case was 
whether the trial court had erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu, i.e. 
sua sponte, and the state supreme court agreed with defendant that the 
trial court should have done so. See id. at 103. 
458. Id. at 105. 
459. Prasad, supra note 49, at 3100 (noting that people can suppress stereotyped 
responses when made aware of those issues); see also Blasi, supra note 28, 
at 1252 (“In order to inhibit judgments and behavior based on stereotypes, 
we must be aware of the specific stereotype at the time it is activated.”). 
460. See Earle, supra note 34, at 1215 (arguing that courts should “give serious 
and consistent credence to charges of racism and recognize the many instances 
in a trial in which subtle arguments may prey on unconscious fears and 
resentments of the jury” rather than just deeming comments “regrettable” or 
“improper”). While Earle’s focus was on appellate rather than trial courts, 
the same logic applies to trial courts, particularly if they are going to take a 
major role in dealing with racist prosecutorial rhetoric as argued in this article. 
461. Blasi, supra note 28, at 1254. 
462. Courts do not need to use the word “racist” in labeling the conduct; it is 
probably more effective to talk about invoking a stereotype or triggering 
bias. Consistent with the approach throughout the article, the focus should 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial 
112 
Furthermore, a reprimand in front of the jury may create more 
personal risk for the prosecutor than the current approaches, which 
externalize the costs of prosecutorial misconduct.463 If racist prosecu–
torial rhetoric contributes to the conviction, then the defendant bears 
that cost, while the prosecutor’s office is the one that primarily bears 
the cost of reversal on appeal.464 But when a trial court expressly labels 
a prosecutor’s rhetoric as being an inappropriate invocation of bias or 
stereotypes, the prosecutor will likely feel some shame.465 The trial court 
should not set out to humiliate the prosecutor, but “psychologists have 
long deemed shame a healthy tonic in appropriate doses because it 
reminds the recipient of the societal norms that should guide and 
circumscribe her thoughts and actions.” 466  Therefore, labelling the 
prosecutorial rhetoric as an inappropriate invocation of bias or stereo–
type can help encourage prosecutors to avoid that behavior going 
forward and help the jury guard against being influenced by that 
rhetoric.467 
After the court labels the improper remark as potentially triggering 
bias, the trial court should give a specific rather than general curative 
instruction. Reviewing courts sometimes rely on the fact that trial 
courts gave general instructions not to rely on bias,468 but that approach 
is flawed. If a trial court overrules an objection, or if the conduct is 
 
be on the conduct rather than the person and to avoid moralizing language 
when possible. 
463. Green, supra note 268, at 812. 
464. Id. at 812–13 (explaining why the prosecutor’s office bears the primary burden 
of reversal but is still likely to back the individual prosecutor, concluding that 
“even if the trial prosecutor’s behavior was clearly wrongful, the office may 
excuse it on the theory that a suitably aggressive prosecutor cannot help but 
get carried away occasionally”). 
465. See Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by 
Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 305, 312 
(2016) (quoting Deni Smith Garcia, Three Worlds Collide: A Novel Approach 
to the Law, Literature, and Psychology of Shame, 6 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 
105, 121 (1999)) (“Shame ‘falls along a continuum of emotions ranging from 
embarrassment on one end to mortification on the other.’”). 
466. Id. 
467. See id. There may be some risk that this approach will lead jurors to 
sympathize with the prosecutor, but the court in doing this labeling should 
reinforce egalitarian norms of avoiding biased decision-making, rather than 
specifically using the word “racist” or focusing on the prosecutor's intent. 
468. For example, in Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), the case involving 
the comment about the defendant being an animal who should not be let of 
his cell except on a leash, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction in part because “the trial court instructed the jurors several times 
that their decision was to be made on the basis of the evidence alone, and 
that the arguments of counsel were not evidence.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 182. 
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never flagged as improper, then jurors could reasonably conclude that 
the general instruction to avoid bias does not apply to the specific 
comment at issue.469 The level of detail needed for curative instructions 
will vary depending on the circumstances, but trial courts should 
provide any specific direction needed to ensure that the jury properly 
recognizes the situation and to encourage prosecutors to avoid similar 
missteps in the future.470 
3. Grant a Mistrial for Particularly Serious or Repeated Violations 
During the Same Trial 
When an isolated remark is quickly corrected before the jury, that 
should be a sufficient remedy. But in other circumstances, the court 
should consider granting a mistrial. The foundational case on prosecu–
torial misconduct in argumentation emphasizes mistrial as a remedy.471 
Mistrial is an appropriate remedy for many cases involving racist 
prosecutorial rhetoric because of the difficulties in measuring potential 
prejudice from that rhetoric.472 Mistrial is also appropriate in many of 
these cases because of the significant harm caused by these remarks.473 
When considering whether to grant a mistrial, courts should 
provide both parties an opportunity to be heard outside the presence 
of the jury.474 The prosecutor should have to argue why the comments 
 
469. See, e.g., State v. Diehl, 528 S.E.2d 613, 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), rev’d 545 
S.E.2d 185 (N.C. 2001). The court of appeals correctly highlighted the 
inadequacy of the trial court’s response to defense counsel’s objection, which 
was “Well, let’s just—We’re not going to have that thing going on.” Id. at 
615, 617. The appellate court correctly reasoned that this “overly brief and 
vague comment did not admonish the jury to disregard the objectionable 
remarks. We hold that direct and decisive action by the trial court was 
required in the form of an instruction directed to the jurors notifying them 
that the prosecutor’s appeal to race was improper and that they should 
disregard it.” Id. at 617. Unfortunately, however, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court reversed this decision and incorrectly concluded that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion. Diehl, 545 S.E.2d at 188. 
470. See Prasad, supra note 49, at 3125 (noting that judges should “be prepared 
to describe what implicit associations and stereotypes the improper argument 
may draw”). Prasad relies on both the idea of providing clarification for the 
jury and informal discipline/incentives for better behavior for the prosecutor. 
See id. 
471. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935) (“The trial judge, it is true, 
sustained objections to some of the questions, insinuations and misstatements, 
and instructed the jury to disregard them. But the situation was one which 
called for stern rebuke and repressive measures and, perhaps, if these were 
not successful, for the granting of a mistrial.”). 
472. Lyon, supra note 15, at 334. 
473. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 233 So. 3d 529, 563 (La. 2017). 
474. See Lyon, supra note 15, at 333 (arguing that the court should hold an 
immediate hearing without the jury present to determine whether a prosecu–
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were not likely to be prejudicial, and could also argue any probative 
value to justify the remarks.475 Defense counsel should have the oppor–
tunity to respond to these arguments and could potentially provide 
wider context for the remarks, such as how they relate to comments 
made in voir dire.476 This hearing would help the trial court consider its 
decision with a fuller picture of how the comments fit into the overall 
trial, and would allow the court to make explicit findings that would 
help the reviewing court on appeal if a mistrial is denied.477 
The precise standard for granting a mistrial could vary according 
to typical court practice, but courts should consider both the prejudicial 
effect of the comments and any potential probative value they have. 
For example, in Louisiana, a mistrial is mandatory after defense motion 
when “during the trial or in argument, [the prosecutor] refers directly 
or indirectly to . . . [r]ace, religion, color, or national origin, if the 
remark or comment is not material and relevant and might create 
prejudice against the defendant in the mind of the jury.”478 This app–
roach requires the court to find both a lack of probative value and a 
potential for prejudice. Courts could instead use the stronger balancing 
approach described above in the motion in limine section, requiring the 
court to conclude that the probative value substantially outweighs any 
potential for prejudice.479 
Regardless of the precise standard used, a mistrial would generally 
be appropriate for very serious racial references, such as slurs, animal 
imagery, or other statements that directly invoke a negative stereotype. 
Similarly, a mistrial would be appropriate if the prosecutor had brought 
 
tor’s racist rhetoric was prejudicial). While defense counsel should generally 
move for a mistrial, courts could ask to confer with the parties about this 
remedy after intervening sua sponte, as discussed above. But defense counsel 
should be allowed to weigh in on the appropriate remedy. Cf. Armour, supra 
note 68, at 768 (suggesting that defense counsel should actually have the 
ability to choose the remedy). While I think Armour’s suggestion goes too far, 
I agree that defense counsel’s perspective should be an important consid–
eration. 
475. See Lyon, supra note 15, at 333–34 (discussing a similar approach to a 
hearing). 
476. See, e.g., Thompson, 233 So. 3d at 529, 534 (discussing the connection 
between the prosecutor’s comment in questioning a witness to an earlier 
exploration of race in voir dire and both parties’ opening statements). 
477. See Lyon, supra note 15, at 334 (noting the often inadequate record for 
reviewing courts and the value of holding a hearing in providing a better 
foundation for appellate review). 
478. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 770. The “Official Revision Comment” 
for the statute notes that “[t]his article purports to carry out, with some 
variation, the jurisprudential rules with reference to remarks and comments 
which normally are not cured and cannot be cured by an admonition.” Id. 
479. See supra Section IV(B)(1)(c). 
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a motion in limine and then made remarks that violated the court’s 
decision on the motion. Mistrial would also be appropriate for cumu–
lative violations, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Berger v. United 
States.480 Ultimately, trial courts should be more willing to grant a 
mistrial in order to guard against racist prosecutorial rhetoric preju–
dicing the defendant and to ensure that prosecutors bear the burden of 
avoiding this rhetoric.481 
D. Track Repeat Violators Across Trials 
Finally, I recommend that courts provide greater transparency and 
tracking of these rebukes across cases.482 That approach can take a 
variety of different forms, such as a searchable database that records 
key information about incidents of racist prosecutorial misconduct or a 
compilation of transcripts of these instances.483 Regardless of the exact 
mechanism used to implement this idea, these “rebuke banks” could be 
helpful in several ways.484 
On an individual level, these rebuke banks may help incentivize 
prosecutors to ensure that their rhetoric does not cross the line. This 
applies both to new prosecutors wanting to avoid rebukes and long-
time prosecutors who may need to shift their behavior after recognizing 
the ways that their previous rhetoric may have been problematic.485 
After all, the key goal of this article and these strategies is to prevent 
racist prosecutorial rhetoric. 
Additionally, this approach would help courts and disciplinary 
authorities identify repeat offenders. For trial courts, that information 
could be helpful as they play an increased role in being vigilant about 
 
480. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935); see supra note 471 and 
accompanying text. 
481. Lyon, supra note 15, at 334–35. 
482. This specific proposal relies heavily on Bruce Green’s recommendation. See 
Green, supra note 268, at 815–18. But it is also conceptually similar to creating 
a “prosecutorial misconduct project” tracking appellate court reversals for 
prosecutorial misconduct. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: 
Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1059, 1064 (2009). Both Green and Gershowitz argue that making this 
kind of information available would help identify repeat offenders and put 
pressure on prosecutors’ offices to improve their cultures and practices. See id. 
at 1065; Green, supra note 268, at 815–16. 
483. See Green, supra note 268, at 815 (arguing for a searchable database of trial 
transcripts). The exact mechanism may vary across courts based on logistics, 
and chief judges or court administrators should explore the most workable 
version of this approach for their particular jurisdiction. 
484. See id. at 815–18. 
485. See id. at 816; see also id. at 813 (discussing the potential for “unethical 
amnesia” when individual rebukes do not also include more structural remedies 
as well). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial 
116 
listening for racist prosecutorial rhetoric and acting sua sponte. 
Knowing who has been rebuked before and why may help judges 
recognize more subtle racial appeals in future cases. It may also be 
helpful in encouraging judges to refer these repeat offenders for 
disciplinary action and for disciplinary authorities to have more 
complete information upon which to act.486 
Finally, and crucially, rebuke banks would help decision-makers 
identify patterns within prosecutor offices, which in turn can lead to 
more structural reforms.487 This increased transparency can support 
efforts by supervisors to strengthen a “culture of compliance” within 
offices that could improve “internal culture and controls.” 488 
Additionally, this device could help encourage office-wide trainings as 
needed, and could even help with efforts to hold senior administrators 
accountable for office-wide problems.489 These more structural incen–
tives should help counterbalance the structural pressures on prosecutor 
offices to focus more on convictions than on their important role in 
ensuring justice.490 Ultimately, these changes are crucial for dealing with 
the structural problems of racial bias within the criminal justice system. 
Conclusion 
Racist prosecutorial rhetoric is a serious problem that poses a threat 
to the integrity of the criminal justice system. This article has attemp–
 
486. Green correctly notes that disciplinary authorities have generally been 
unwilling to discipline prosecutors in these cases. Id. at 811; see also Prasad, 
supra note 49, at 3119–22 (discussing prosecutor discipline and arguing that 
courts have so far overestimated that technique for handling racist prosecu–
torial rhetoric). It may be that disciplinary rule changes are also needed, 
something I plan to explore in a future article. 
487. See Green, supra note 268, at 816–17. 
488. Id. at 816. 
489. See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 51, 70 (2016) (“[C]ritics increasingly push blame 
up the ladder in the prosecutors’ office, perceiving low-level prosecutorial 
wrongdoing as symptomatic of bad culture, bad leadership, bad compli–
ance systems, or other systemic inadequacies for which supervisors and 
chief prosecutors should be held responsible.”). 
490. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 16, at 330 (discussing the structural pressures 
on prosecutors and their offices); Godsey, supra note 83, at 34 (describing 
“administrative evil,” the way that actors in a bureaucracy are structurally 
conditioned to focus on what’s good for the organization in a way that can 
functionally silence individuals’ own moral compasses); Richardson, supra 
note 22, at 871 (describing an ethnographic study of criminal courts in Cook 
County, Illinois, in which several prosecutors expressed personal misgivings 
about the criminal justice system but “learned to rationalize their racialized 
behaviors by separating their perspectives from their practices” and treating 
their practice of law as a duty that did not need to reflect their personal 
beliefs). 
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ted to educate judges and prosecutors on how to rethink rhetorical 
choices within criminal cases. Doing so is an important part of the 
overall reckoning about the role of racism within the criminal justice 
system and is necessary for ensuring that criminal trials are conducted 
fairly and impartially. 
Trial courts should take the lead in recognizing racist prosecutorial 
rhetoric and in taking steps to prevent prosecutors from using that 
rhetoric. Trial judges are also in the best position to act when 
prosecutors do use this rhetoric and to evaluate appropriate remedial 
measures. The line-drawing questions presented by prosecutorial rhet–
oric can be challenging, but this article has proposed an approach that 
can help courts draw these lines more clearly, allowing for prosecutors 
to argue the appropriateness of race-related language and arguments in 
individual cases while prohibiting a much wider swath of both coded 
and explicitly racist language than courts typically label as inapprop–
riate. This article also includes a method for tracking racist 
prosecutorial misconduct across cases that would facilitate better 
systemic information about the scope of the problem, which will help 
provide more systemic responses. 
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Appendix A: Possible Checklist for Courts to Use in 
Prohibiting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric: 
 Prosecutors should keep their arguments focused on the specific 
evidence regarding the defendant in a particular case, rather than using 
broader language that invokes stereotypes or group-based biases. 
Courts should enforce this approach and should prohibit the following 
types of arguments or language as being inherently biased, regardless 
of the prosecutor’s intent:  
 
• Racial slurs 
• Animal references/analogies (including actual animals, use of 
other words that convey animal imagery like “hunt” or 
“habitat,” movie references like “Gorillas in the Mist,” 
references to monsters or other non-human imagery, etc.) 
• Language invoking stereotypes (e.g. Dixie/cotton reference, 
generalizations about groups based on race/ethnicity, coded 
language to invoke race) 
• Us/them references (e.g. “these people,” “protect your 
community”)—do not try to divide the jury from the defendant 
based on generalized appeals  
• Unnecessary emphasis on locations with racial connotations or 
the race of the defendant or the victim beyond what is necessary 
in the case 
• Arguments suggesting that the severity of the crime or trauma 
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 Despite these general prohibitions, some cases require a discussion 
of race. In such cases, courts should require a motion in limine by the 
prosecution to justify the probative value of racial references and to 
ensure that it substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect. Courts and 
prosecutors should consider the following general guidelines in connec–
tion with this motion: 
 
Likely Appropriate (substantially 
more probative than prejudicial) 
Likely Inappropriate (more preju–
dicial than probative) 
• Limited reference to race for 
identification purposes only 
when identity is an issue 
• Repeated references to race to 
show identity, or a single refer–
ence to race to show identity 
when identity is not disputed 
• Discussion of race in connec–
tion with the validity of cross-
racial identification 
• Accusations that identification 
argument is based on stereo–
type that all people of a race or 
ethnicity look alike 
• Arguments related to racial 
motive only when there is evi–
dence supporting that theory 
• Arguments related to race as 
motive that are based on 
speculation or generalizations 
rather than concrete evidence 
 
 Note that a motion in limine should never be used to justify racial 
slurs or animal imagery, which are never probative and are always 
highly prejudicial.  
 Similarly, a motion in limine should not justify invocation of a 
stereotype; the prosecutor should focus instead on the evidence in the 
case without making broader group references to invoke stereotypes.  
 Additionally, courts should not over-rely on the idea of the 
prosecutor’s remarks being an invited response to defense counsel’s 
argument. The prosecutor’s response should focus on the substance of 
the argument (e.g. mis-identification, self-defense) without either 
explicitly or implicitly invoking stereotypes or bias. 
 Finally, references to race, even when relevant, should be kept to a 
minimum to the extent possible under the circumstances of the 
individual case. Repeated references are more likely to be prejudicial, 
and the probative value can generally be established through limited 
references.  
 
